# Bakhmut's symbolic value outlasted its military value

Markdown copy of https://realalpha.app/s/bakhmuts-symbolic-value-outlasted-its-military-value/ on Real Alpha, the best minutes from long interviews with the people building AI. Cite and link the page, not this copy.

- Speaker: [Michael Kofman](https://realalpha.app/people/michael-kofman/) · Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment · Led foundational research on Russia’s military and studies Ukrainian forces and Eurasian security at Carnegie.
- Host: [Lex Fridman](https://realalpha.app/people/lex-fridman/) · Host, Lex Fridman Podcast · Robotics and AI researcher at MIT; started the show in 2018.
- Show: Lex Fridman Podcast
- Episode: [Russia-Ukraine War: Putin, Zelenskyy, Trump and the Future of Warfare | Lex Fridman Podcast #504](https://realalpha.app/v/2hJkprFnzhY/), Nov 10, 2026
- Moment: 1:25:58 to 1:31:42 of the episode (6 min), playing on https://realalpha.app/s/bakhmuts-symbolic-value-outlasted-its-military-value/; the episode from there: https://realalpha.app/v/2hJkprFnzhY/?t=5158

## Quote

> “the loss of Bakhmut **wasn't nearly that critical** at the end of the day.”
> — [Michael Kofman](https://realalpha.app/people/michael-kofman/) at [1:27:37](https://realalpha.app/v/2hJkprFnzhY/?t=5257) · Lex Fridman Podcast

## Takeaways

1. Bakhmut's political importance exceeded its strategic value.
2. Holding the city risked tying down experienced Ukrainian troops.
3. Declaring a city a fortress can make withdrawal harder.

## About this segment

Michael Kofman describes how Bakhmut became a politically charged battle that tied down Ukrainian forces and shaped Western expectations. Its eventual loss, he argues, mattered less militarily than its symbolic weight suggested.

From “Russia-Ukraine War: Putin, Zelenskyy, Trump and the Future of Warfare | Lex Fridman Podcast #504”, Nov 10, 2026. [Watch the full episode](https://realalpha.app/v/2hJkprFnzhY/)

## Transcript

Transcribed by machine (Whisper) from the episode’s audio, so a word may be off here and there.

[1:26:02](https://realalpha.app/v/2hJkprFnzhY/?t=5162) So Bakhmut syndrome is, Bakhmut became a fixing point in the war at a critical period because what was happening in the war around this fight is in the fall, Ukraine had two remarkably successful offensive operations. One was in Kharkov, where Russian military literally routed, and the other one was in Kyrgyzstan, which was much more slow going and plotting, but nonetheless forced the Russian military to withdraw and retreat from the western side of the Dnipro Riverbank.

[1:26:36](https://realalpha.app/v/2hJkprFnzhY/?t=5196) They were both successful, and they began to set the expectation that actually this could be a shorter war, that Ukraine could achieve a military victory in this war. And the Russian military then tried to use Bakhmut as essentially a fixing fight But employing Wagner, which were kind of the expendables in this battle Prigozhin may not have seen him and his forces that way But certainly that's the way they were being used And it became a grinding fight And as it became a grinding fight over time, it started to sap morale But battles like this take on political significance I personally think that the loss of Bakhmut wasn't all that important or meaningful. In fact, I don't just think that I know that because it took the Russian military a whole year to get from Bakhmut to Chasaviyar, the next town over on higher terrain.

[1:27:25](https://realalpha.app/v/2hJkprFnzhY/?t=5245) Still fighting for it. And it took them even another year to take a large part of Chassev Yard, okay? And if you look at where they are from Bakhmut, distance-wise, the map, it's not far. So one can safely now argue, I think, the evidence is in, incontrovertibly, that the loss of Bakhmut wasn't nearly that critical at the end of the day. Critical for the broader strategy of the war. So why over-fixate on Bakhmut?

[1:27:52](https://realalpha.app/v/2hJkprFnzhY/?t=5272) Well, the challenge is that battles become politically significant, even if tactically they might not be justifiably freighted with that significance. And political, when you mean, is it like Stalingrad in the World War II? Because certain leaders up atop, there's certain fixation in a particular city as a symbol. Yes. The Battle for Buckingham to me was one freight with political significance because it was a contest, right?

[1:28:20](https://realalpha.app/v/2hJkprFnzhY/?t=5300) And wars, by their nature, are fundamentally a contest of wills and they're a contest of systems between states. And these then become bellwether events. And what happens is political leaders often see the battle as significant. Maybe the city itself is not critical, but they can't afford to lose. Why? It became very important for Ukraine because Ukraine heavily depended on external support, on Western support, and wanted to maintain the perception after successful offensives in the fall that the war was going their way, that they had the momentum, okay?

[1:28:54](https://realalpha.app/v/2hJkprFnzhY/?t=5334) And believed that further expectations of support, the equipment they wanted to receive, the additional capabilities and training they wanted to receive, would be tied to the sense in Western countries that Ukraine is winning. And so they're very concerned. This happens all the time. Wars are full of sunk cost fallacies in this pathology of thinking. Naturally, very concerned that the loss of Bakhmut would lead to a turn in sort of Western public sentiment and the views of political decision makers in Western countries.

[1:29:25](https://realalpha.app/v/2hJkprFnzhY/?t=5365) And so there was this whole campaign organized called Fortress Bakhmut. I always worry when any city, especially a fairly small city, is declared a fortress, because then it means that forces there will not be able to withdraw or retrograde in a timely manner. Most people who end up in those battles I know from Ukrainian troops also always worry when something's declared a fortress, because then they know that's going to be a pretty tough and bitter fight.

[1:29:49](https://realalpha.app/v/2hJkprFnzhY/?t=5389) But essentially what happened was this became a prolonged attritional fight over Bakhmut. Ukraine was able to draw the fight out, but I'm not sure necessarily to their benefit. And what happened was it tied down quite a few units in the fight for Bakhmut. and there's an ongoing debate to what extent did the battle for Bahamut expend very experienced troops in exchange for holding on to a town for some extra period of time but on the other side the Russian military was fighting with these expendable Wagner forces a lot of them were convicts second to what extent it pulled in forces that then could have been used and trained that were very experienced that could have been used and actually trained on western equipment and could have led the summer offensive in June of 2023, instead of having green, new, inexperienced troops with the better Western

[1:30:43](https://realalpha.app/v/2hJkprFnzhY/?t=5443) equipment, but nonetheless lacking experience having to conduct a very difficult breaching operation. So all these questions remain. I know we'll continue to debate them. But the bottom line was Bakhmut syndrome. It was essentially choosing to defend the city past the point when it made sense. And that would often happen because it's very difficult to withdraw from a population center, right? Population centers often fix fights.

[1:31:07](https://realalpha.app/v/2hJkprFnzhY/?t=5467) That tends to be at least the character of this war. And also, defense is often anchored around population centers, around cities. They serve as a key part of defense, right? So once the fight actually becomes a siege of a population center, you then get into the situation where it's very hard to withdraw and you'll see Russians expend an immense amount of troops and personnel to try to take it, destroy the city in the process.

[1:31:34](https://realalpha.app/v/2hJkprFnzhY/?t=5494) But Ukraine also bitterly hold on to the city in an effort to try to exhaust the Russian offensive there.
