# Baylor Endowment on Rethinking Venture Capital, Concentrated Portfolios, and Power of Compounding

Markdown copy of https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/ on Real Alpha, the best minutes from long interviews with the people building AI. Cite and link the page, not this copy.

Renee Hanna says Baylor can compound private-market returns through repeatable expansion-capital wins and concentrated commitments to trusted managers.

- Show: How I Invest
- Hosts: [David Weisburd](https://realalpha.app/people/david-weisburd/)
- Guest: [Renee Hanna](https://realalpha.app/people/renee-hanna/) is a Managing Director of Investments at Baylor University.
- Published: Nov 16, 2026
- Length: 1 h 3 m

## The best minutes

- [5:50](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=350) [Expansion capital can compound more reliably than early venture](https://realalpha.app/s/expansion-capital-can-compound-more-reliably-than-early/) (3 min)
- [13:24](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=804) [A concentrated portfolio helps Baylor focus capital and time](https://realalpha.app/s/a-concentrated-portfolio-helps-baylor-focus-capital-and-time/) (6 min)
- [49:31](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2971) [Later-stage venture can offer attractive risk-adjusted returns](https://realalpha.app/s/later-stage-venture-can-offer-attractive-risk-adjusted/) (3 min)

## Also worth watching

- [1:22](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=82) [Seed valuations have weakened Baylor’s case for early-stage venture](https://realalpha.app/s/seed-valuations-have-weakened-baylors-case-for-early-stage/) (5 min)
- [11:07](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=667) [Baylor seeks upside without depending on power-law returns](https://realalpha.app/s/baylor-seeks-upside-without-depending-on-power-law-returns/) (3 min)
- [26:58](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1618) [Baylor requires a 15% net IRR to justify illiquidity](https://realalpha.app/s/baylor-requires-a-15-net-irr-to-justify-illiquidity/) (3 min)
- [36:11](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2171) [Baylor sees room for data-rich software firms to adopt AI](https://realalpha.app/s/baylor-sees-room-for-data-rich-software-firms-to-adopt-ai/) (3 min)
- [43:41](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2621) [Active managers should move capital toward stronger opportunities](https://realalpha.app/s/active-managers-should-move-capital-toward-stronger/) (5 min)

Skip the LP peer-network discussion, the AI-career chat, the SpaceX funding history, and the later behavioral-finance discussion.

## Full analysis: Renee Hanna says repeatable threefold returns can compound to 27x

- Threefold returns repeated every five years can compound to 27x over fifteen years in Hanna's example.
- That math checks, but the transcript gives no realized fund series or full fee and loss record.
- Allocators should test net results, liquidity paths, and manager workload before copying the strategy.

Its 6 sections, what it means for you and what to watch are on [the page](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/#analysis), free with an account:

- [6:42](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=402) Baylor built a growth lane around overlooked expansion deals
- [8:47](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=527) Hanna's 27x figure is a compounding scenario
- [28:26](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1706) Baylor prices illiquidity against public equity
- [16:04](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=964) Fewer relationships let Baylor concentrate capital and attention
- [50:03](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3003) Baylor finds later-stage rounds more attractive
- [44:24](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2664) Active review frees capital when the thesis weakens

## Summary

Renee Hanna is Managing Director of Investments at Baylor University. She has spent more than 17 years helping manage Baylor's $2.7 billion endowment.

Hanna says Baylor built a private-markets strategy without legacy exposure to top early-stage firms, leaning instead on expansion capital and carefully selected co-investments. She argues that repeatable 3x returns over five-year periods can compound to 27x over 15 years, and that concentrating capital with trusted managers helps Baylor focus its time and investment dollars. Baylor uses a 15% net IRR hurdle to justify illiquidity, while Hanna says later-stage venture now looks more attractive when product-market fit and growth reduce uncertainty. She also discusses AI's impact on software, active portfolio management, and the value of judgment, relationships, and time to think.

### Minute by minute

- [0:00](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=0) **Baylor rebuilt without legacy venture exposure.** Hanna says Baylor rebuilt its portfolio from scratch beginning in 2014, without legacy exposure to early-stage firms such as Sequoia or Benchmark. She says a $5,000,000 check would not move a $2,700,000,000 endowment's returns much, while each new manager adds work for a lean team.
- [1:22](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=82) **Seed valuations challenge early-stage venture math.** Hanna says seed entry prices have risen, with an average price closer to $700,000,000, making it harder to achieve the returns Baylor needs. She says the team favors specialized managers with an edge in areas such as FinTech or digital health, and is more comfortable investing later, after product-market fit.
- [3:20](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=200) **Co-investments require a clear liquidity path.** Hanna says Baylor typically co-invests through GPs it already backs, relying on their research and a visible route to an IPO or M&A. She says Baylor avoids tying up capital in one co-investment for 12 to 15 years and looks for a 3 to 5x outcome within 3 to 5 years. Early- and later-stage venture each account for roughly 10% of the portfolio, with the balance in expansion capital and lower-middle-market buyouts.
- [5:50](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=350) **Expansion capital targets overlooked companies.** Hanna says Baylor leaned into expansion capital because it lacked legacy venture holdings and found overlooked companies that venture managers might pass over for being outside major hubs or having smaller markets. She says these businesses can enter at an enterprise value below $100,000,000, with multiple exit paths. Baylor allocates closer to 30% to expansion capital, versus 2% in the Burgess benchmark.
- [11:35](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=695) **Concentration supports a steady-return strategy.** Hanna says Baylor values consistent returns and wants to protect against losses while retaining some upside. She says fewer manager relationships let the team focus on its strongest GPs; Baylor has 20 private names that matter, and its top 20 account for about 25% of the overall portfolio.
- [17:38](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1058) **A finite budget narrows GP sourcing.** Hanna says Baylor deploys $160,000,000 in a calendar year and typically has capacity to add one new GP. The team maps portfolio gaps, such as being underweight healthcare, then takes meetings in those priority areas rather than maintaining an open door for every strategy. She says that focus saves time for both Baylor and GPs.
- [21:30](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1290) **GP concentration signals conviction.** Hanna says she likes when GPs put substantial capital behind their strongest ideas, because that concentration can signal conviction and drive closer attention to a company. She says Baylor's LP network is collaborative but also competitive, with peers tracking how their endowments compare.
- [25:48](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1548) **Private investments must clear a 15% hurdle.** Hanna says Baylor is risk-conscious because its 5% spending rate supports the university's operating budget and scholarships. She says private investments must generate a 15% net IRR to justify illiquidity. Baylor arrived at that hurdle by starting with a 6% public-equity return assumption, adding 350 basis points, and layering in another 5% for illiquidity.
- [30:50](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1850) **Venture platforms may keep scaling.** Hanna expects venture platforms to grow and companies to stay private longer, leaving a market split between early-stage specialists and very large platforms. She says three of Baylor's top GPs converging on the same later-stage company was a signal she paid attention to when evaluating the opportunity.
- [36:22](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2182) **AI and legacy software can coexist.** Hanna says some legacy software companies will fail to adapt, but others have their own data and customers willing to test AI products through existing providers. She says Baylor has continued to back software managers whose strongest companies are making that transition, and that AI-native businesses and software companies can both succeed.
- [40:25](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2425) **Judgment and relationships remain valuable.** Hanna advises students to build authentic relationships through follow-up and thoughtful gestures, rather than treating networking as transactional. She says investors still need to understand a model and judge its results, even if AI can build it. For her, the ability to think and make a call matters alongside efficiency.
- [43:41](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2621) **Active exits can improve portfolio construction.** Hanna says Baylor tested the secondary market on a manager's portfolio after seeing little expected growth over five years, then accepted a compelling bid to accelerate liquidity. She says GPs should sell companies that are unlikely to meet their underwriting and shift reserves toward winners, rather than treating follow-on capital as automatic.
- [49:31](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2971) **Late-stage venture offers a clearer risk profile.** Hanna says Baylor has moved from almost no late-stage venture exposure to looking more closely at companies with product-market fit, visibility, and growth. She says the target remains 3 to 5x in 3 to 5 years. Weisburd cites a 75x return for later SpaceX investors, and Hanna says the shorter holding period made that kind of outcome attractive.
- [55:31](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3331) **Contrarian investing takes discipline and reflection.** Hanna says Baylor has become more comfortable holding a view against the market while continuing to revisit its thesis; she thinks being in Waco can reduce the pressure of constant peer chatter. She says she would tell her earlier self to make more face-to-face meetings that are not with GPs and to leave time to think. She also favors GPs who keep fund growth disciplined and build lasting LP relationships.

## Transcript

How I Invest, hosted by David Weisburd, with Renee Hanna.

From the transcript How I Invest publishes with the episode.

[0:00](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=0) As we were rebuilding the portfolio effectively from scratch beginning in 2014, we didn't have the benefit of having legacy exposure to early stage names. We didn't have Sequoia. We didn't have Benchmark. Because we didn't have that luxury, we had to go down a different path of trying to create upside and capture growth exposure in the portfolio in a different way. People often talk about this saying that the fund size is a strategy for GP, but it also seems to be the strategy for the LP as well. Absolutely. We're trying to construct a portfolio. And so if I can get into a great name and it's only a $5,000,000 check size on a $2,700,000,000 endowment, I'm not sure that I care.

[0:34](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=34) Right? It doesn't move the needle. And we are also operating with a lean team. We've got three people on the private team, three people on the marketable team, three people on the ops team. Every time you add a new line item, you're effectively, like, increasing the workload for everybody else. And so you want it to count. So you have this front row seat. Endowments are arguably the sexiest and the most attractive LPs, so you get to meet with a lot of the managers. You're talking to a lot of the start ups as Today, Venture is roughly $3,500,000,000,000 asset. Five years from now, is that number higher?

[1:04](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=64) The platforms will continue to grow and get bigger and scale. I think that companies saying private longer is not gonna go away. I think you'll continue to have kind of a bifurcation in the market where you've got these early stage specialists that are playing coupled with, these very large platforms. Being in Waco, Texas and chatting with you multiple times, you have several very contrarian views. What's another thing that you disagree with your other health peers? There's a lot of Renee, you're managing director of private equity at Baylor University, has $2,700,000,000 under management. And last time we chatted, you said something really interesting, which is you used to operate under this framework that venture managers should get into companies as early as possible.

[1:43](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=103) Today, you're not so sure. Why not?

[1:45](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=105) **Renee Hanna:** For us, the biggest hurdle is just the entry valuations have changed so much at the pre seed and seed stage rounds.

[1:51](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=111) And so when you look at the entry price, and we still think it absolutely matters what you pay for these assets, when you're paying an average price of closer to $700,000,000 And that's the seed round. The seed round. We're skeptical about, how large the TAM needs to be for us to get the outcomes that we need to make the venture math work, given the duration of the holding period. So in other words, it might make sense to wait a little bit and maybe get in at $1,500,000,000, but it's massively more derisked than three x. Yeah. Absolutely. And we were talking about before we started recording, like, does a pre seed and seed manager even play an environment like today, given their fund size and their portfolio constructions?

[2:33](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=153) What do you see the top GPs doing today? There's a variety of ways to play it. I can tell you the GPs that we're attracted to are the ones that have a specialization, a certain right to win. And so, we've leaned into groups that have a FinTech specialization. We have a manager that's focused on digital health, and that's all they do, but they're an ex operator. And we feel like they really have a right to win in that space. We've refined the strike zone for the GP that we think would give them more access. It sounds like the specialization is more important for you for getting into the top deals versus knowing which deals to go into.

[3:05](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=185) Is that just a matter of the environment today? For us, knowing which deals to get into at a very, very early stage is really hard, right, which is why we're happy to go into later stage rounds when you have product market fit. We're leveraging intel from existing GP. There could be a path to IPO over the next three to five years, and you're definitely capping your return, but feel more comfortable about the certainty of that return versus, quite a bit of zeros when you're going early stage. But this is your direct investing platform. So we last chatted, I think, three sixty episodes ago. How has that evolved over the last couple of years, given that current environment?

[3:42](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=222) We've had the benefit of really great access with our existing GP network, where they've got some pro rata rights that they've shared with Baylor, we're able to double down on those opportunities. We've also changed our view a bit on later stage investing, whereas before, it was just something that we shied away from, and clearly we've missed some of those opportunities. But today we're more willing to leverage the network that we have. We have some great GPs in our portfolio, so we feel very comfortable with their selection process and the returns that we'll be able to recoup, with these guys and able to layer in that exposure that we just weren't doing a ton of before.

[4:20](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=260) Talk to me about your process and when you decide to directly invest into a startup. I'll back it up to how we think about investing and where venture sits in our portfolio, because candidly it's a bit more muted relative to what we do across the portfolio. Early stage venture for us is roughly 10% of the overall portfolio. Another 10% is going to be in later stage opportunities. And the balance is going to be in expansion capital and buyouts across the lower middle market. So, to date, when we've leaned into a co investment opportunity, a more direct investment, It's been through the lens of leveraging our pre existing GP network and feeling very comfortable with their research, the path, and the line of sight to liquidity for us from here.

[5:05](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=305) I think liquidity is one of the big things that we focus on when we're going into co investment. You won't see Baylor lock up capital for a twelve to fifteen year run-in a co investment opportunity. It's just too long of a life for us in a single name. We understand the duration risk you're taking when you go into early stage venture in a fund. We're just not willing to do it on one isolated name. It's just... It's not what we're good at. And how do you underwrite the duration on direct investments? Typically, it's gonna be something that has more of a path of a three to five x in three to five years.

[5:38](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=338) And in terms of liquidity, you're just looking for something with a certain amount of revenue? For liquidity, we want, a clear path to liquidity and a line of sight to either an IPO or an M and A outcome. I wanna take a step back. You're a managing director of private equity, so you're really focused on private equity as a whole. Seems like you've really gone into two different directions. One is venture capital, and one is lower middle market. Talk to me about that strategy. So reminder, we're Baylor University. We're sitting in Waco, Texas. And so part of the reason why we've leaned so heavily into lower middle market, as we were rebuilding the portfolio effectively from scratch beginning in 2014, didn't we have the benefit of having legacy exposure to early stage names.

[6:22](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=382) We didn't have Sequoia. We didn't have Benchmark. A lot of those positions have grown organically to be very large allocations within certain university endowments. Because we didn't have that luxury, we necessarily had to go down a different path of trying to create, upside and capture growth exposure in the portfolio in a different way. And one of the areas that we sought to exploit was effectively this line of expansion capital. And if you look at the Burgess benchmark, it comprises roughly 2% of the underlying allocation versus the market value of venture, which is closer to 14, and buyouts, which is closer to, like, 45%.

[7:01](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=421) And I think the reason why it's only 2% is because there's a lot of miscategorization that happens across these lines. It's kind of a gray area, which to us was the reason why we wanted to lean in. And so effectively, it's orphaned venture assets, something a venture manager would probably not touch because it's either in the middle of the country or it has a smaller TAM. And so, we've been able to pick up these assets where you're coming in at an enterprise value less than $100,000,000 with multiple paths to exit either through M and A activity or selling to larger private equity sponsors. This episode is presented by Juniper Square, the operations partner for private markets.

[7:40](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=460) I've had over 450 episodes. Think this is the first time an institutional investor has gone after this part of the market. Tell me more about the market, and how do you even size it? Our allocation of expansion capital is closer to 30% relative to the 2% that's in the Burgess benchmark. But even within our venture portfolio, we have groups that have venture at the end of their name, but you look through to the underlying portfolio and it's comprised of eight to 10 companies.

[8:05](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=485) **Renee Hanna:** They're getting access to these companies where there's 5,000,000 in ARR, scaling at north of 50% per annum, getting ownership stakes of closer to 30%.

[8:15](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=495) It doesn't look and feel like an early stage venture manager. The loss ratios are definitely lower than an early stage manager. But they're very consistently having a repeatable process of getting that three to 5X in three to five years, which to us we're very comfortable with because of the compounding nature of those investments. If I sign up for an early stage venture manager and I am fortunate enough to get a 15X multiple over the course of a fifteen year period, I'm actually better off if I can sign up with a repeatable expansion capital manager that gives me a 3X consistently every five years.

[8:47](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=527) Because at the end of the day, I'm sitting on a 27X multiple. As we were building out the portfolio, we found that we had a lot better access to those names, and that seemed like an opportunity that we could continue to exploit. As I like to remind people, 3x over twenty years is not a good return. People are so focused on multiple, they just forget about IRR. And especially for taxable investor like Baylor, the compounding is massive. Yeah. Absolutely. A three x is not interesting over a twenty year period. I'm fascinated by going after these these companies. In many ways, it's a counter thesis.

[9:21](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=561) So Marc Andreessen famously says, we're in a consensus market. There's no more diamonds in the rough, only diamonds. What that invariably says is that there's a large part of the market, the majority, probably 90% plus of startups, especially those funded before 2023, are just not impressive enough, are not growing two x every quarter that that gets the interest of the venture capital markets today, the the large funds. So invariably, there's hundreds, if not thousands, of these companies. I think one of the most underappreciated aspect of that is there's a huge opportunity cost of the board member's time.

[10:00](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=600) If you're a board member at Excel or Andreessen Horowitz and you invest into some kind of SaaS company that was triple triple doubling, which was really the criteria a couple years ago. And now because of that board seat, you're not able to invest in the next Cursor or the next OpenAI. You would give up a lot just to get out of that position. And I love that. Like, I hope that that's what's going on because I'd love for our expansion capital managers to swoop in and be the ones who participate in that triple triple double that's not interesting to a venture. It's almost like a secondary in that you're solving somebody's problems.

[10:31](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=631) Correct, yes. Yeah, absolutely. Structural alpha. Absolutely. And oftentimes we see once they get access to these companies, they find that the GP is a really good partner and the founder enjoys working with them. So there's lots of opportunities to preempt the round where the founder can continue to focus on their day job. The GP can step in and provide a financing round, and they can go about their business. And it's also, one of the value add that they bring is the connectivity to other GPs, larger GPs. And there's a lot of private equity capital out there. Over the last five years, capital commitments have stabilized at roughly 1,500,000,000,000.

[11:04](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=664) There's a ton of dry powder to go in that needs a place to invest. And effectively, we are creating product for large buyout to invest in. Sitting where you're sitting today, three weeks ago, had Matt Harris from Bain Capital Ventures. And I I think for 10 funds now, they've been top quartile, almost all their funds. But they haven't had these massive fund returners, these, like, 100 x or thousand x. And he said some of his LPs were upset about that, and I saw that as a huge advantage. Mhmm. Made me really think about maybe venture LPs are almost manic or bipolar in some way, and that they're looking for the power laws as if that's like the benefit to getting the three x net.

[11:41](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=701) Or do you think that's the case, or do you think that three x net is just a result of something that's just higher vol and more risky? For us, we love consistency. So maybe that makes us boring, but I'd be happy to invest in a Bain fund that's consistently generating a 3X type return, and something that we can count on over an appropriate duration, right? Like, to the extent that you can give us a repeatable process, we'll take that all day long. And being in Waco, Texas, and chatting with you multiple times, you have several very contrarian views. What's another thing that you disagree with with your other LP peers?

[12:14](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=734) There's a lot of really smart investors out there at different institutions, and there's more than one way to build a portfolio. And, you know, really the outcome of this for Baylor is simply like we didn't have access to these great venture firms, in the past, and so we had to build a book differently. Fast forward to today, and you think about the risk profile of the portfolio that we're

[12:34](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=754) **Renee Hanna:** building at Baylor, we very much want to defend zero. And we recognize that in doing so, you necessarily might cap your upside.

[12:42](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=762) And so, one of the things that we have really worked on is how can you construct a portfolio where you can keep up to the upside? So, using June 3026 as an example where there's going be a lot of groups that have SpaceX in their portfolio, a lot of other endowments. Returns are rolling in. And so, at Baylor, we're sitting there kind of holding our breath because we don't have SpaceX exposure. And you're seeing numbers come in at, you know, north of 20%. We came in at 19%. And that that feels pretty good given how we're constructing the portfolio and giving ourselves some ways to participate in an upside, without being subject to power law or the volatility that comes with it.

[13:16](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=796) You mentioned earlier on you were almost forced into this contrarian or differentiated way to look at venture capital. Today, the large multi stage firms are just getting so much bigger. Is it still difficult to access those names? It's still difficult to get into the early stage products with the size that we want. So, at Baylor, one of our alpha drivers, that we see is concentration. We're really trying to construct a portfolio with fewer line items. Historically, I think we've been overly diversified, it was really just a race to the middle. So, to the extent that we can get access to some of these larger platforms, I think we would have a better shot at it today.

[13:58](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=838) But I do not think we'd be able to size it in a way that would give us the exposure that we need. People often talk about this saying that the fund size is a strategy for a GP, but it also seems to be the strategy for the LP as well. Absolutely. I mean, we're trying to construct a portfolio. If I can get into a great name and it's only a $5,000,000 check size on a $2,700,000,000 endowment, I'm not sure that I care, right? It doesn't move the needle. And we are also operating with a lean team. We've got three people on the private team, three people on the marketable team, three people on the ops team.

[14:29](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=869) Every time you add a new line item, you're effectively, like, increasing the workload for everybody else. And so you want it to count. What are some other, I guess, second order effects of just having too many names? You get spread too thin in terms of travel. We work really hard to be on the L PAC, and not because we need that board seat. It's more about the relationship. We've seen that when you're on the L PAC, you have a tighter relationship with the GP. It tends to be more collaborative. We want to have that give and take. And with that, you necessarily need to spend time with the GP. You need to show up to the annual meeting.

[15:00](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=900) You need to be there in person. And that's not scalable. There's only so much of you to go around in a three sixty five day calendar and still give yourself time to actually think about portfolio construction and what your next step should be. The return on time is probably the most critical piece that we think about as we bring in a new line item. It's Upstream of these relationships are, going back to earlier conversation, is these direct investments, these co investments that are so critical to your returns. Oftentimes, talk about Dunbar's law, which is you can only really manage a 150 close relationships.

[15:28](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=928) And people will argue until they're blue in the face, but the podcast is actually one of the only hacks that I've seen in terms of increasing Del Mar's Law where you could build this relationship and and keep up these relationships. But Mhmm. It's so hard to have too many close relationships. Even though people hate this idea, they hate being boxed in to this 150 relationships in practice, it's it's pretty consistent with what I've seen. I'm impressed if somebody can manage a 150. We have 20 names in our book that matter. And what other strategic benefits out of these 20 names in terms of... On on top of direct investments, what other strategic value do you get from your managers?

[16:04](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=964) We are purposefully keeping our book tight and refined in terms of the number of GPs that we can commit to. And one of them is because of scale. We really want to lean into our top relationships. And so we're seeing commitments go from $20,000,000 in fund two to $40,000,000 in the subsequent fund. As we gain conviction in a GP, we really want to put our money behind that and back them. And it also allows us to have a more concentrated portfolio. We've worked really hard to get more capital into our top 20 names If you rolled it back, say, even five years ago, it was closer to $100,000,000 in our top 20 private names.

[16:40](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1000) **Renee Hanna:** Today, it's closer to two fifty, so approximately 25% of the overall portfolio.

[16:46](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1006) And when you look at the 1,300 line items of portfolio companies across the book, 80% is in the top 300. It took some work to get there, but it's by design. We don't necessarily have an approach where we have to be in the top GP of that vintage for that strategy. Let's find somebody we can find a partnership with. Let's find somebody who's really, really good at executing in this space. And then let's back them with the full force of Baylor behind it and continue to back them for several funds. You know, obviously they need to hold up their end of the bargain and continue to perform well, but we're not gonna jump ship just because you were top quartile and not top decile of that particular year because we're gonna believe in your ability to execute over time.

[17:26](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1046) Roger Vinson, who was formerly at Cornell Endowment, he talked about he believed the systematic error most LPs are making is they're overly diversified. They have a portfolio of companies within the manager, then they have 20 managers or 40 managers, and they have... Sometimes they even have diversification on that, vintage diversification. Yep. And at some point, you're essentially just getting the market. Right. And you're you're basically defeating the entire purpose of being an active investor. Mhmm. Couldn't agree more. So we make really tough decisions. We have a finite budget of $160,000,000 that we're deploying in a given calendar year.

[17:59](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1079) And we typically have capacity to add one new GP to the portfolio. And so, we're very thoughtful about our portfolio framework. Where are we under allocated? Today, we're underweight healthcare, so we're spending a lot of time market mapping and what does our next move look like? Is it going to be an early stage commitment versus lower middle market buyout? Where's the best place to put capital to work? And then we take meetings that fit in that lane. We don't take meetings across the board in categories that aren't a high priority for us. Again, going back to our return on time, we're very thoughtful about how we spend our time when we're in the office and the pipeline that we're building based on the capital budget that we're trying to fill.

[18:38](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1118) I love that because the mere fact that you even know where the holes in the portfolio are is upstream of being able to have these strategic calls, which is upstream of that is having a concentrated portfolio. Mhmm. So a lot of people, it's hard for them to envision, well, what would I do with extra time? Well, you don't envision it because you don't even have the time to think about things. So kind of having a concentrated portfolio could also open you up to having time to focus strategically. A lot of people will be like, We have an open door policy. We take meetings, and there's lots of learnings that come from that.

[19:08](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1148) And I think early on in your career, when you're an analyst and you're trying to flex that muscle and get pattern recognition, I can understand how that would make sense. But over time for us, we felt like we just aren't having enough time to think. And candidly, as a GP, that's a waste of your time as well, right? If I know that I'm taking a meeting in private credit and we do not invest in private credit, like why do you want to sit down with me? There's much better places to spend your time, and I'm happy to make introductions to the groups who I know really like that flavor of investing. But it's a waste of everyone's time for us to take that meeting.

[19:39](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1179) I think this obsession with optionality, whether it's venture capitalists, keeping startups kind of pitching and never saying no to them because there's this one in 1,000 chance that they might turn around and invest. Right. And same with the LPs and GPs. I I think it's one of the big logical fallacies for a couple of reasons. One is, first of all, like, there's opportunity cost to talking to that one in 10,000 chance company. You could be talking to somebody that might be a one in 10 chance. And secondly, and perhaps most more importantly, is your reputation. It's a it's a recurring game. So if you have this reputation that you're always stringing people along, it's not gonna take long before founders talk to each other, and they're gonna not not include you in the hottest companies.

[20:18](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1218) Absolutely. We're not perfect. We try to be really transparent, and let people know what we're thinking. And I hope that that translate... That when Baylor says, we're leaning in, we would really love for you to to secure an allocation of $20,000,000, we're taking it to our board for a full recommendation that they know we're gonna come through. And we do. I want Baylor to be the place where people come. It's like they do what they say they're going to do. It's how you get the first call. Yes. Absolutely. One thing I've learned from talking to hundreds of investors is that great investment firms aren't built on investment returns alone.

[20:49](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1249) The firms under are great at the things most people don't see, their operations, their relationship with LPs, and the quality of information they use to make decisions. And here's what AI has changed. Every firm now has access to the very same models, so the intelligence isn't the edge anymore. The edge is what you could feed it. Firm with its fund operations and data in one connected record can actually put AI to work. A firm running on disconnected systems simply can't. That's why thousands of GPs run their funds on Juniper Square. Juniper Square puts your fund operations, data, and administration together in one connected record.

[21:24](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1284) That means less time managing disconnected systems and more time investing, working with LPs, and building your firm. This episode is brought to you by Juniper Square, the operations partner for private market GPs. Learn more at junipersquare.com/howiinvest. That's junipersquare.com/howiinvest. Going from concentration in your portfolio to the concentration of some of these largest companies in the portfolio of venture capital managers, it's also downstream of this consensus market, is these funds piling in massive amounts of capital into the winners. What do you think about that? And what's your mental framework for thinking about concentration within specific managers?

[22:05](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1325) I actually love concentration in GPs. I want a GP to invest in their best ideas. And effectively, it's what we're doing within the private investment portfolio and across the Baylor University portfolio at large, even on the marketable side. That angst of when you're putting a ton of capital to work behind a single name, you're probably gonna be really thoughtful about each incremental dollar. And I hope that it keeps you up at night because if it blows up, it's a problem. Right? And I love that because I think that means you're probably going to pay attention to the details. You're probably going to be on the phone and have a really tight relationship with the founder.

[22:37](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1357) You're not going to sit it and forget it. You're going to be paying attention to what happens with that name. And if you're willing to put 20% of your capital, 30% of your capital plus into a given name because you believe in it, I suspect you're investing with significant conviction behind it, and I can get on board with that. I think that's how you add alpha. It's a strong signal. The concentration itself is the signal. Absolutely. Scott Wilson, famous CIO of University of wash... Washington, St. Louis, he would actually go to the managers that are at their concentration limit, and he would say, could we get more money into those opportunities?

[23:08](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1388) Because he realized that, a, those were their highest convicted bet. And, b, there's only so much career risk that a GP could take. Because everything's probabilistic. Let's say that you're in SpaceX. You love Elon Musk. You... This is ten years ago. You you believe totally in his mission. There's still some 10, 20, 30% chance that the entire business fails. Mhmm. And even Elon Musk will be the first one to to admit this. So you can't put in 50 of your fund, although some people have done that. Mhmm. It's worked out really well for them. But you shouldn't really do that. You still wanna manage your portfolio, have some kind of portfolio construction, some kind of diversification.

[23:40](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1420) But if you put 20% of your fund in, that's a very interesting signal for the LP to come in and say, well, we actually want more of that. Mhmm. That's a bit counterintuitive. It's a great point. I... We have a lot of respect for Scott Wilson and what he's built at Washington University. They've killer portfolio, really great returns, and very thoughtful investors. Speaking of your peers, LPs are often these mythical creatures. I I obviously bring in a a lot to to share their views, but a lot of people don't know what goes on kinda behind the curtain in terms of LP to LP relationships. Are you meeting with other allocators as well?

[24:15](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1455) And what do you guys talk about? The LP network is really friendly and really collaborative. And I think at the end of the day, if endowments and foundations have good returns, it ultimately translates to more students going to school, more people in higher education. And it feels like a really collaborative network of peers and feel very fortunate with the network that I've built over my career at Baylor. And then at the same time, I also feel like we're pretty scrappy and love to win. Right? Like when the new Kubo report comes out, we're absolutely looking at it, as I'm sure all of my peers are, to see where we rank compared to those schools that we have an affinity for or closely aligned to in AUM, you know, respect.

[24:53](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1493) We mentioned Scott Wilson, but we're definitely paying attention to how other schools are doing and how we compare on a relative basis. There's a form of co opetition. Friendly co... Friendly competition. Absolutely. It always befuddled me that people can't come and be competitive with someone else or collaborative. When I am competitive or collaborative, I say, hey. Here are the 20% of the places where we're competitive. Mhmm. Let me call it out. Let me put this on a piece of paper. Let's talk about the other 80%. There's no... This is zero sum right here. We're competing for the same opportunities, same businesses.

[25:22](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1522) That's totally fine. How do we collaborate on the other 80%? And I think just just bringing in kind of that... This transparency and this, like, I mean, just just naming what it is. It is coopetition could be very powerful. A 100%. And I played softball growing up. I played a little bit, in college, and my favorite people to play and ultimately beat were, like, your biggest rivals. Right? You had the most respect for them. A lot of them ended up being your friends because you've been playing them for years. And I think that competition is healthy. Like, you really show up when you're playing those games.

[25:51](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1551) And so I think the element of competition is, a powerful driver. And we're all pretty competitive in the office, especially Dave and I. One of the things I've been thinking about since... For the last 360 episodes since we last chatted is your reputation of being concentrated, your reputation of being a true alpha investor. You would think most endowments would want to do that. But at the same time, you see a lot of endowments being conservative. So I'm wondering, what is it that gets your team to be more aggressive and more risk taking versus some of your peers? We're thoughtful about the risks that we take.

[26:26](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1586) I wouldn't describe us as being like super high risk takers. In fact, I think we're the opposite. I think we're actually a pretty risk averse bunch, and so we have to push ourselves to take more risk on the margins. But I think there's risks that we're willing to take. Right? And concentration is one of them. To your point about leaning in with conviction, we've gotten very comfortable leaning into the best ideas of GPs that we trust, And it's worked out well for us. At the same time, when you look at the risk return metrics of our portfolio, we've done a really good job protecting the portfolio to the downside, and that's paid off well.

[27:00](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1620) So, think both things can be true, where you're thoughtful about the risk that you're taking and where you add alpha, and still preserve the value of the portfolio so that you don't have wild swings in returns. Because that's very difficult for the university to manage, right? They're counting on our 5% spending rate that gets distributed back to the university. They're depending on it for the operating budget. There are students that are depending on it for scholarships. So, to have wild swings in the returns of the portfolio is really not something that we're trying to do. And so, we're trying to defend zero, also giving ourselves the ability to participate in the upside.

[27:32](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1652) We're very aware of the 5% spend that we have every day and trying to preserve the corpus and compound it over time. Sounds like an oxymoron defending against zero when it comes to venture capital. How do you do that, or is that just on an overall portfolio? I don't put venture capital in that bucket. I mean, in venture, I don't expect to defend zero. So when we go into an early stage name, we understand what we're signing up for and the loss ratio that we're going to absolutely have in that particular strategy and understand the power law that's associated with it. And it's just less of what we do.

[28:03](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1683) It's gonna stay at around 10% of our overall portfolio. And just to zoom out a little bit more, you have 10% venture. You also have private equity. How does that fit into the overall portfolio for Baylor? 55% of the portfolio is marketable alternatives. 45% is private investments. We've been there for the last couple of years, and it feels pretty good.

[28:22](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1702) **Renee Hanna:** Anything coming into the private investment portfolio has a line in the sand of generating a 15% net IRR.

[28:28](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1708) To justify the lack of liquidity, particularly in a rising rate environment, there's absolutely an opportunity cost of being illiquid, and we peg it at 15%. And we got there through really just looking at the long term returns of public equity. If public equity is going to generate a 6% return, we need three fifty basis points on top of that to justify being in the portfolio. And then we layer in an additional 5% for that opportunity cost that I was just referencing. Essentially, you're forging a liquidity premium on your portfolio. Absolutely. If we're going to tie up our capital for ten years, we need a return to justify that.

[29:03](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1743) So that was another genesis for looking at the overall line items and how diversified we were. Why does private investments exist in the portfolio? It doesn't exist for diversification. At the end of the day, it's equity. So why are we bringing it into the book? To It's deliver outsized returns relative to public equity. So what is that number? And so that necessarily cuts categories. I mentioned we don't invest in private credit. It's because of the return profile. It's effectively not enough, to get into the portfolio. And if it is higher than 15%, it's probably because it's lower in credit quality, and my upside is necessarily going to be capped.

[29:35](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1775) And so it just hasn't been a category that we've been attracted to. I understand, you know, the attraction of that category. But in terms of Baylor and the reason why private investments exist in our book, it just hasn't made sense. A lot of people discovered this in 2022. They had 60 to 40 portfolios, and then they had 40% bonds. And because bonds weren't returning enough, they went lower and lower in the quality up to basically junk bonds. Mhmm. And then lo and behold, now they're almost one to one correlated with equities. So what you basically had is correlation to equities but a lower return Mhmm.

[30:11](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1811) Versus historically, bonds were supposed to be kind of negatively correlated to equity. So you want to be careful that there's these obvious traps that people get into when they misuse the asset for what it's intended to do. Yeah, absolutely. You know, and I think the genesis of private credit and private financing and how large that that market has grown ties into private companies staying longer because they necessarily have, greater optionality for access to capital that they didn't have. So you don't have to tap into the public markets. You can maintain control of your business for longer.

[30:41](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1841) You can have more autonomy. And it makes sense that companies are choosing to stay private longer than they were in the past because of the availability of capital that didn't used to exist, at least not in the same fashion as today. Speaking of the private markets, you have this front row seat. Endowments are arguably the sexiest and the most attractive LPs, so you get to meet with a lot of the managers. You're talk... You're talking to a lot of the start ups as well. Today, venture is roughly $3,500,000,000,000 asset. Five years from now, is that number higher? Is that number lower? What do you make a sense as a whole of the venture asset class?

[31:16](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1876) I think that the platforms will continue to grow and get bigger and scale. I think that companies saying private longer is not gonna go away. I think you'll continue to have kind of a bifurcation in the market where you've got these early stage specialists that are playing coupled with, these very large platforms. I came to the same conclusion when I had Matt Witthiler from Wellington. And he told me that the public markets have the equivalent of a 127,000,000,000,000. So 3,500,000,000,000, a 127,000,000,000,000. So that's at a high level. And then you double click and you look at what's going on in the private markets and the venture capital markets specifically.

[31:49](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1909) Q one twenty twenty six, 76% of all venture capital money went into five names. Mhmm. Which goes back to this kind of concentration question, which is how how con... How diversified are you if you're in venture capital as a whole? But another side effect of that is that there was no more money to be had for these five companies. So if you're Anthropic, OpenAI, SpaceX, there's an argument that there's just not enough private capital in the world to fund an... Another round. Said another way, if you did another round in some of these companies, you would be deploying now a 100% Mhmm. Of all private capital.

[32:26](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1946) In my sense, dealing with a lot of founders is the most ambitious founders would, all things being equal, would love to stay private longer. Mhmm. I think even SpaceX, I believe they're twenty four years into being private. Elon would have stayed public for even longer if he... Would have stayed private for even longer if he had chance. I I think they just exhausted the private markets. So if you look at ground truth, you know, venture capital is this access class where the founders choose the GPs and the top GPs choose the LPs. And if you look at the ground truth, which are the top founders, all things being equal, if there are 7,000,000,000,000 in the market, yes, it might still go to the same five companies.

[33:04](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=1984) But I think Anthropix, OpenAI, SpaceX, a lot of these companies would perpetually be private because they just love the idea of being able to think long term, not being subject to the quarterly financials, not being subject to all the other negative externalities that come to being a public company. I suspect the minute you turn into a public founder, the game completely changes. I also think there's some king making going on in terms of the amount of capital and where the dollars are going, but I also think it's real. Love to hear your thoughts. But capital as a moat definitely seems to be kind of cementing the winners as they evolve.

[33:41](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2021) I think there's a lot of different perspectives on that. One is I think you have to distinct between businesses that are data driven and token driven versus other businesses. Mhmm. So at some point in the near future, it might be sooner than most people realize, human beings are gonna be surpassed their intelligence by AI, which means that it's gonna be a matter downstream of token usage, how well a company is run, how how good of a strategy it has versus the talent, which is a little bit scary to think about. It is. But that... That's one side of it. And then the exact opposite is also true, which is if you don't have a capital intensive business and you could vibe code your website over the weekend, what is your moat?

[34:24](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2064) Mhmm. And now you look at data, you look at training data, and you look at customers and different aspects that could be moats. But a lot of the moats end up being capital in nature. So then the question becomes, well, would... Is this company successful because it raised a lot of capital, or did it raise a lot of capital because it's successful? And I think it's a combination of that. It showed early signals that it was gonna be the winner, and then a bunch of capital came in and essentially made it self self fulfilling. Mhmm. I agree. It's interesting to see how the market plays out. I mean, we see it in our portfolio.

[34:59](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2099) We invested in a co investment recently. It was a later stage round. It's not something that we normally do, but it was sourced from one of our top GPs in the portfolio and got very comfortable with the opportunity set and the trajectory from here. And we ultimately had three of our top GPs that were coalescing around this name, which gave us even additional comfort. But there was a very consistent thesis, a lot of capital chasing it, and, it was just interesting to see three of our top GPs going after the same play. If I'm honest, that's a signal that I really pay attention to. Mhmm. It's almost like the rule of marketing.

[35:34](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2134) The... It's almost like the rule of seven in marketing, which the first three times you ignore something. And then by the time it's the fifth time you go to the website, and then the seventh time, like, what the hell is this company? Should be paying attention. Okay. The first two people, it was interesting that they mentioned it. By the fifth time, it's like, this is clearly consensus. So now I have to... It basically forces me as a VC to make a decision. Is the entire market... Is the consensus market wrong? Mhmm. Or are they right and and I should invest in it? So this kind of... This... The...

[36:04](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2164) Just hearing through the zeitgeist and hearing through your relationship about about a name is is such an underrated aspect of investing. Yeah. And that's definitely how we felt. It was... This isn't something we normally do. It was a very short fuse, but it felt like we should pay attention to this. And ultimately, we got to the finish line on it, and I feel really good about it. We're all very excited to bring that exposure into the portfolio. And to the extent it works, it's gonna be a meaningful position to the endowment. So I want to go to AI, which basically every podcast talks about, but very specifically in the context of managers and the managers that you are backing in a post AI or a post ChatGPT moment versus the previous ones?

[36:43](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2203) What are the main distinctions between what you're looking for from managers? There's a lot of different flavors. Of late, there's been a lot of discussion about AI native versus legacy software. And really, as you think about the AI companies that are moving forward, is software dead? And I think at the beginning of this year, you saw like a very definite, view that AI was going to be a winner and software was no longer going to have a reason to exist. Over time throughout this year, you've seen that like, that's not necessarily the case. Is there going to be some legacy software businesses that don't make the cut and can't transition into this new AI world?

[37:15](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2235) Absolutely. But to your point about data, we've also some, some really strong SaaS businesses, some

[37:21](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2241) **Renee Hanna:** software applications where they do own their own data And the customer is very comfortable with them pushing out and testing AI products through their software provider.

[37:30](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2250) When you look at. Main street versus perhaps what's happening in Silicon Valley. I think there's a lot of companies that don't have the wherewithal right now to really vet and bring in different AI opportunities. Recently with the cybersecurity, there's a lot of news out there about the different attacks and things that have happened. I just think a lot of people aren't ready to just fully pivot and pull the trigger and move into an AI world. They're very happy to move forward with a software provider that's AI enabled and testing products. And so we've actually seen that in our own portfolio, where some of our legacy software GPs are putting capital to work in, their top performers who have been able to make that pivot, have been very aggressive.

[38:09](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2289) I think there's a world going forward where you can have AI wins in AI native businesses, whether you're picking it up through venture or other means, and your software portfolio also continues to do well. So we've actually been a little bit contrarian in our view. We added to software at the beginning of this year. Dave made a really nice trade that paid off. And we've continued to believe in our software portfolio, on the private investment side as well. I think that they both can exist. I had David Breach, who runs Vista Equity now. And, of course, I had to ask him about the SaaS apocalypse and the future of software.

[38:44](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2324) And one of the trends that he sees across his entire portfolio is that software is going from something that you plug in and almost use it as a user to actually done for you, so services component. Mhmm. So instead of now going into your CRM and you're saying, well, let me put in the notes, and here here here, I met with Renee. Here's kind of what we talked about. It already is gathering information from our Zoom call, and it's already making strategic decisions. Oh, I... You should follow-up in three months. And it's almost becoming and replacing the knowledge worker versus just being a software.

[39:14](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2354) And I think that's where a lot of the top software companies are evolving to. Mhmm. It's more of an agentic approach where you have an agent because that's very valuable. Yeah. Because if you could actually take away spend from your human capital and expand that human capital and make every every employee three to five times more productive, how much is that worth versus an application that you may or may not use that you log in every couple months? So just having an agentic part of your team that's helping you execute, I think, is probably a highly underrated aspect of the software market today.

[39:49](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2389) It's very early innings. And so from an employment base and trying to understand like where the job shift is going to be, I think it's too soon to tell. I don't think that you're seeing massive layoffs as the result of AI. I think you're seeing stabilization of employment. And so maybe you can do more with less and you don't need to add that new person that you were going to add this calendar year. Maybe you add them next calendar year and you can hire every couple of years instead of every year. Perhaps it's you're adding people at a slower rate. If I was graduating right now from college, it'd be a difficult time to decide, like, where is the best place for me to go.

[40:21](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2421) Right? I think things are shifting, and I think we'll probably have more clarity over the next five to ten years. But I think right now, it's a bit murky. I just had my first child, so I'm not yet worried You have about time. You have Give give me your No, the way. Thank you. But you you obviously... You're on university. You're actually on campus. You're dealing with students. I think you have student interns as well. What's advice that you're giving them? I'll tell you where I think about my value add. And in a world where AI is coming, think it goes back to that relationship component. And so one of the things we're really spending a lot of time talking through with, students and even in our office is just the relationship aspect.

[40:59](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2459) AI is going to be able to possibly replace a lot of things going forward, but I think it will be very difficult to replace the relationship aspect of what we've built. And so if you're a student that you're coming out of Baylor or any undergrad, really thinking about how you refine your relationships and your network in an authentic way. And I think a lot of people talk about curating a network and going to conferences and how you do that. But I actually think it's much harder in practice to do the hard things, to follow-up, to write a handwritten thank you note, to be intentional, to have it come across as authentic versus transactional.

[41:34](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2494) I think these are really hard things to get right over time. We spend a lot of time talking to students about the softer side of that. What about hard skills? What survives? How you would write a memo, how you would sell a memo, understanding the Black Scholes model if you're working through derivatives, and all these things that, like, I very much valued when I was getting my CFA and really curated my ability to write a good, thoughtful memo. But today, I think it would be more like the ability to think. Right? You might have an AI tool that can create an LBO model for you. But, like, can you really sit down and analyze the results And then have the wherewithal to be like, oh, you know, here's the sum of that analysis.

[42:14](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2534) We should add more capital or wait a minute, let's pull back. Let's let's sell this. Like, it doesn't make sense. So I think that ability to think, and I think it's going to be hard to think and analyze if you don't know how to do, right? Like if you're just letting an AI model, an AI tool build a model for you and you can't understand the results, like that's a problem, right? But I think that, at least for myself, I'm better because I know how to build the model myself. Right? So I I don't know. Like, there's a bit of a tug and a pull on efficiency, versus effectiveness. I think it's the most overused term, taste, especially among venture capitalists.

[42:53](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2573) But I think there's something to it. And I think being able to have taste or judgment. Mhmm. Because now, you could just accomplish things so quickly. Right. Even just down to our programming, to our thumbnails, there's certain people that know what kind of feels good and what the guests would like, what the audience would like, and other people wouldn't. And it's almost like this saying common sense is uncommon. Mhmm. It's very uncommon to have somebody both have taste, judgment, agency as well, being able to solve problems. There's a saying, do you create problems or do you solve problems? Mhmm.

[43:25](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2605) And that is the fastest way to rise in an organization is to solve problems and go to your boss and say, what else could I do? Mhmm. And it's just a small part of the market and a small part of the people are able to be high agency enough. A lot people look at their jobs as... They have a punch card whether they're literally using it or not. They punch in, they punch out, and hope that nobody notices them. I think it's gonna be a very difficult time for for people like that in the future. Yeah. As we think about portfolio construction and the art of building a portfolio, private equity, it is very much like a a sit it and forget it asset class.

[43:57](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2637) Right? It's a ten year term. But you can be tactical. You can look at your book and be more thoughtful about what you own. We recently got off a phone call with a legacy manager. Effectively over the next five years, it was going through the liquidity schedule that we had. But when we looked at the growth rate of that book, it was effectively a zero. I think that everything's appropriately marked. If anything, in a rising rate environment, it could be mismarked. But I don't see a ton of upside here. And so after hanging up the phone, we immediately called a number of our secondary brokers and was like, Hey, let's test the market on this and see where these assets would trade.

[44:31](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2671) We got a very compelling bid from a group that was purely focused on this particular strategy. They were able to add leverage, so it was a reason why they could pay more than That everybody structural analysis. Right. They had structural... It made sense for them. It was significantly higher than the other bids that we had seen in the past. And we hit that bid. And when I look at making that trade, even at a discount relative to my cost of capital, which is 15%, it makes perfect sense. It was a portfolio construction decision. It would expedite liquidity. We're going to an election year in 2028.

[45:03](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2703) Rates are rising. Like, feels like a good time to get some cash back in the door. And I think those types of decisions require thinking, right? It's not like there's a model that said you needed to sell this asset today. It was just we hung up the phone. It was like, Why don't we see if there's a way to resolve this in a way that makes more sense versus just signing up for a very benign five year ride? Goes back to what we were talking before, which, yeah, maybe you left 20% off the table, but if that 20% takes five years Right. It's not interesting. You're you're getting beat by treasuries. Right.

[45:36](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2736) Exactly. You mentioned this concept of managing your book and being active in your book as a private equity or venture capital manager, how does one do that? I mean, for us, it's like the example that I just gave of taking That's advantage on the of side. What about on the GP side? On the GP side, I think it's leaning into concentration, putting capital behind your best ideas, selling the mighty middle. If you have a number of companies that look like it's gonna be a one to three X, the return on your time, going back to that, I think is super critical. Don't waste your time on things that aren't gonna deliver a great outcome.

[46:09](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2769) I really appreciate when GPs are very candid about that, where they're selling assets that are not going to have the outcome that they underwrote to. They're selling them early. It's like, there's a bid for this. Even if it's at par, sell it. Even if it's less than par. Like, I'm gonna recoup, you know, half of my money on this, but it's no longer gonna be a time drag for me. And the amount of time it would take to turn it around, tell you that I'm gonna hit a two X, ultimately sell it three years later at a one to one and a half. Like, don't do that. Just get it off your plate. I... At least from Baylor, it comes from a standpoint of, like, transparency and no judgment, and that's what you're supposed to do.

[46:43](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2803) You're supposed to make those calls. You're supposed to trim the fat and focus on your winners. That's what you're paying your managers to what we pay them to do. And I think that's what can take, a good fund and turn it into a great fund. You said a very subtle but underrated point, which is even if you've deployed all your primary capital, so you're... You know you're gonna have 10 positions, You still have money for pro rata. Let's say you have 30% of your book to follow on. If you're very active, the right strategy is to spend as much time with those 10 companies, figure out who the winners are, who the losers are.

[47:15](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2835) So when the time goes to follow on, you could increase your returns. A lot of times, people don't think about their exercising their pro rata or doing their follow ons as an active strategy, almost like a passive thing. But you could be getting information. You could be talking to other managers. You could be talking about competitors who might be coming into this market. You become more educated on your existing book. It's not always adding to your book that leads to alpha. One of my biggest pet peeves, I think it's no surprise that everybody right now wants co investments and some of it's fee driven.

[47:43](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2863) They want, you know, a 0% management fee and they're trying to dollar cost to average their fees down. And when we see a really great portfolio company that ends up being 10% of the overall portfolio, and they're offering co investments for LPs to participate, which is really just not something that we do a ton of. We want your best ideas to end up in the fund. And you ask, why aren't you leveraging the reserves for this? The answer is typically, well, we don't have reserves for this company. We have it earmarked for other companies that aren't necessarily as visibly obvious that they're working.

[48:15](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2895) Right? But those reserves are squishy. There's no line in the sand that that has to be allocated to that particular company.

[48:22](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2902) **Renee Hanna:** Move it over to the thing that's working right now, because it makes sense. Right? Like you don't have to be so rigid about your reserve allocation.

[48:30](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2910) And sometimes it does feel pretty rigid, whereas your best win... Your best idea, your winner should get the capital. So one of the biggest logical fallacies is this concept in venture capital of preserving your ownership or retaining your ownership in an asset that's not great. Mhmm. It's just illogical. There's no mathematical sense. I I went down the rabbit hole. I talked to dozens of people. I was trying to see what didn't make sense, but every net new dollar that you ever invest needs to be the highest and best use of your capital. Now the counterexample, the the one good argument against it is you...

[49:02](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2942) If you make a promise to a founder or you're known as somebody that follows on to your companies as some of these multistage firms, there's a reputational aspect. But from purely financial standpoint, there's no such thing as defending your position or defending your pro rata. It's a completely nonsensical thing. And I think even of late, there's so much capital now in later stage rounds that I don't feel like people care as much if the early stage investor continues to follow-up. That's the paradox, is that the founders that always get upset about you lowering your allocation are the hottest companies, and the ones that really need your capital are the ones that get upset with you when when you kind of lower your pro rata.

[49:36](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=2976) So that itself is a... I think one of the strongest signals. What have you changed your mind on since we last chatted two years ago? Probably, how much of our portfolio should be in later stage. And I'm not saying we're piling in at these prices, but effectively before, it was pretty close to zero. And I think now we just got the TAM wrong in some of these outcomes. And so thinking about the room to run and the ability to get a acceptable return, which is three to five x for us in three to five years, and some of these later stage outcomes with visibility and product market fit and growth rates.

[50:17](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3017) That's been an area that we've found more attractive of late. I think people are still trying to digest the sticker shock of these IPOs. SpaceX, 1,750,000,000,000. Anthropic, reportedly 2,000,000,000,000. And they think that these are gonna be the largest companies. OpenAI as well is is in the running, reportedly raising at 1,250,000,000,000. And if that's the case, then there's a chance that these are the three best companies of the next ten, twenty years. There's certainly a chance for that. But historically, that has not been the case. Google was, like, the twelfth or thirteenth search engine.

[50:55](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3055) Facebook was also in the teens. Even going back to to the original .com, Amazon was, I don't know, hundreds and hundreds of retailers. They were not the first movers. So it's very uncommon in a technological cycle that the best... The biggest winners are early. It's never happened before. So I think if you believe that and if you're bullish on that and you believe that there's still other $2,000,000,000,000 outcomes, then in many ways, late stage could be a more attractive risk adjusted bet than than the early stage. That's what a lot of LPs... It's a consensus view at this point. It's not even a contrarian view, which is quite shocking just from five years ago.

[51:35](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3095) We've talked a lot about, SpaceX today, but when we really broke down kind of the math on it, we're looking at the different tranches, and the early stage investors who came in in 2002 clearly had a home run, like exponential outcome. They did phenomenal. But when you look at the people who came in fifteen years later in 2017, and had the benefit of Starlink and just really significant credibility that the company had experienced post that time period, they got a return like 75X. And the IRR math on that, because of the shorter duration and the time it took to IPO, was very similar to what you were getting as an early stage investor.

[52:14](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3134) And we'll take that all day long.

[52:15](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3135) **Renee Hanna:** Like, we're very happy to jump in at a point where you have product market fit. It's been derisked.

[52:21](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3141) And that's a very acceptable outcome to us. We don't have to shoot for the fences and be a first mover. It's just not the game that we're playing. I have to point out, compliance always reminds me, disclose, disclose. We're investors in SpaceX in roughly that time period, in the late two thousand Okay. And... But I've known the company for a while. I've driven in Elon's Tesla, and I've known that community. And one of the things that's really interesting about SpaceX is it's gone through the entire evolution of smart and dumb money. So in the very beginning, before I knew about SpaceX or before I knew about Elon, it was the sharpest capital, Founders Fund, people like that.

[53:03](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3183) I remember meeting Luke Nosek when he was at Founders Fund, and he told me, I'm starting a fund to invest in SpaceX. So I'm like, tell me more. And he's like, no. That's that's it. That's it. My My pitch. Haven't seen the numbers, but I imagine it's probably the It's probably the best funds that has ever... And I thought it was crazy even at the time. I'm like, this is, like, founder level, like, conviction. I mean, it's basically an n up one. So there's people like that. And then for probably a decade, probably longer, it was a family office trade, which, at least at the time, was a very nice way of saying, not the smartest people, people that wanted to say, I invested in SpaceX.

[53:40](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3220) I invested in rockets. A lot of institutional investors did not invest for a while. And then again, it became a smart money trade post Starlink. You know, people like Justin was... Fischner Wolfson, who was there from the beginning, but he started saying, you know, there's this free free walk to a trillion dollar valuation because of Starlink, and it became this highly rational thing. And then you had to get access again. It became an access play Mhmm. Just like I I imagine it was at their earliest stages. But it's interesting these companies go through these entire life cycles. And, frankly, it's Founders Fund that had these really interesting conversations across their entire portfolio, which is sometimes going in the seed is very rational.

[54:18](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3258) Sometimes passing on the series a on the same company is very rational. Passing on the b, and then going into the c Mhmm. Is very rational. So reunderwriting the companies from first principles every single round is what the the best investors do, and it's it's an unusual, and it's cognitively expensive thing to say, well, we're smart to invest before, but now this is dumb. And now we passed on it twice, and now it's smart again. Mhmm. It takes a lot of humility and a lot of mental energy to really do the... Do this gymnastics and re underwrite companies from first principles. It does. It's very hard to to re underwrite.

[54:51](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3291) And I think humility is a great way to put it, to say no, and be like, Oh, now is a good time. The persistence of it and having the wherewithal to stay close to the hoop enough to do that underwriting, I don't think a lot of people do that. So I think it's very impressive when somebody has the persistence and the tenacity to continue to grind a deal until it makes sense. And I think also, speaking from personal experience, once you've missed out on a deal or passed on a deal, you almost start rooting against it. Mhmm. And just... You have to capitalize that loss and say, well, I lost the the previous five x.

[55:21](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3321) I still think there's a 10 x from here, and it's just a hard cognitive thing. You almost start, like, rooting against it. Yeah. I I don't have ill will towards companies, but it's... I just observe that mentally. You just almost start to be an anti fan of the company because you have to justify that I didn't make a mistake. I made the rational decision at that point. It always surprises me how real behavioral finance is. I wish I would have spent more time taking those classes in undergrad. But, in real life and in practice, I mean, just the human behavior of trading and trading mentality is such a real thing that impacts valuations and trades and how we behave and portfolio management.

[55:57](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3357) Yeah. It's a very It's also one of the things that's not really priced into a market. So not only is it real, oftentimes there's alpha there. I'm curious now in your career, what are some behavioral finance things that you've fixed in yourself? Just like that fear of missing out, right? I think with time, you get more comfortable being contrarian. And I think I've learned from one of the best. Our CIO, Dave, is really great at looking at the data, coming up with a perspective, and being willing to be unemotional about it. Even, you know, you could be wrong for some time before you're right, but like continuing to revisit the thesis, does it still make sense?

[56:32](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3392) And investing with conviction whenever you have a view. And I think that that muscle develops with time. It's just not something that's supernatural to just completely go against the grain. And I think we also benefit from being in the middle of the country, in Waco, Texas, right? Like we're not able to just like walk to a cocktail party like you can in New York City. Right? Like, it's very different for us. And so then you don't hear a lot of that chatter. And it would probably be a little bit harder to be contrarian if you're constantly being reinforced by your peers, like how dumb your idea is.

[57:01](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3421) Right? And then being proven that your idea is dumb because that year, what you invested in underperformed everything else that they did, right? Like it's probably harder to continue to have that conviction. And so I think we have a benefit of where we sit in the country that we didn't used to believe was a superpower that now we do. For me, it's been something that I've gotten better at in time as you've seen pattern recognition and just get more comfort in your ability to, make investment decisions. On this promo point, an underrated behavioral finance issue that I see over and over, and this is the worst possible outcome for investors, is they're smart enough but not disciplined enough to execute on the strategy.

[57:41](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3461) What does that mean? That means they see a hype cycle, they pass on the series a, and they pass on the series b. At some point, they lack the discipline. Mhmm. It's been worn down, and then they come in at the pre IPO round. Mhmm. And then it falls down like a WeWork. Yeah. And then they were smart enough to know that it was probably a hype cycle or that it was a bad company, but they weren't disciplined enough to hold the line and to continue saying no. And I think it's one of the... These common things they see smart people do... One of these mistakes that smart people do is that they they don't have enough conviction to follow through the entire life cycle of a company.

[58:16](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3496) Mhmm. I see it too on the, GP side. Obviously, we're very sensitive to fund sizes, and I think the smaller your fund, generally speaking, it ends up being a better multiple for LPs, which is the goal for us, right, to have an ultimately better fund outcome. And the exclusivity a GP can garner and build to create that FOMO from LPs to be like, here's my hard cap. It's two fifty. Like, you're in or you're out, and you might not make the cut. And the amount of, like, access constraint that that brings versus being like, hey, I'm gonna raise my hard cap from two fifty to three fifty. Okay. Well, now it's gonna be 400 because this other group wants in.

[58:53](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3533) Can I have an extension so that they can continue to vet this opportunity versus being like, no, I'm gonna take care of the existing LPs that got me here? To the extent where we grow, it's gonna be modest, and I'm gonna have room for one or two LPs. And I'm going to curate the landscape of those LPs that are going be more aligned with me. And I will invite you in if we have capacity for you. LPs love that. If I'm a GP, that's my strategy as I'm fundraising. But we see so many groups that fall subject to the LP demand. And it tends to be shortsighted because the minute your returns are lackluster, those LPs are not going to be there.

[59:26](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3566) Versus the ones who believe in your strategy, they actually might give you another chance if it's like, lessons did you learn from these missteps? What are you gonna do to fix it going forward? That capital will probably be stickier. It goes back to who's willing to play the long term games. Exactly. Yes. Long term games compound, but going back to this previous issue, you need to have the conviction. You need to have the patience. And that is, in many ways, a lot of the things that separates the top 50% versus the top 10% venture capitalists. I've never met a venture capitalist that was not smart by by the average population standard.

[1:00:00](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3600) They're oftentimes top 10%, top 5%. But what oftentimes separates them is work ethic, but also just conviction, long termism. And these are these are things that is very difficult to to teach. I think it goes back to kind of when kindergarteners have have the the marshmallow test. I think it really goes back to that. And some people have it, some people don't. Last time we chatted, I asked you, if you could go back to when you had first started at Baylor, and you could give yourself one timeless piece of advice, what would that be? It would be to have more face to face meetings that aren't with GPs.

[1:00:40](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3640) So I didn't really start doing that until later in my career. And actually, on this trip, I am attending a couple of AGMs. But I've also sprinkled in several meetings where I'm just catching up with a friend in the industry that I haven't seen in a while or meeting with the CIO at another university and created space to do that versus before, I would say, I need to jam my calendar with 10 different meetings. I'm going go see 10 different GPs, and not thinking about the value that that creates when you're just like going back to the network effects and your relationship. I wish I would have started curating that earlier on and just understanding the benefits of creating space when you travel to just like let these meetings percolate.

[1:01:23](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3683) When you're back to back to back, then you have to like cut the conversation off because you didn't allow space. For type A people, you can be very high charging, which is, I would put myself in that category where you're like, need to do, do, do, do, do. To get that dopamine reinforcement. Instead of just, it's okay to just, like, sit here, think, have a nice conversation, ask where they're going for vacation. Because the dividends, that pays back when you pick up the phone and you're like, Hey, just met with this GP and I think they might be in your bubble. Like, what do you really think about them?

[1:01:51](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3711) Right? Like that pays off if you can get, one nugget of information that you wouldn't normally get. Right? It could really make or break the underwriting that you do or lead you down a different path to start asking different questions and help you make better decisions. To be honest, this is a systematic error I made when I was younger. I would hear these really smart people like Naval Ravikant say, well, I take a day to think. And I'm like, that is the lamest thing. Yeah. Why does he need a day to think? Why not take an hour? And now I take structure times, typically on the weekends. I'll even go to sensory deprivation tank so that my senses are restored.

[1:02:28](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3748) And then I just go out and I just sit in nature or at some park in New York City. There's not not that much nature. And just see what surfaces. Mhmm. And really kind of nonlinear benefits from that. I think about, well, maybe I should have this guest on. Maybe I think about this investment. Maybe I think about... Well, maybe me and Curtis should take an off-site old meta. You know, maybe we should go and spend time together versus just just by myself. And it's very interesting to see the subconscious as a powerful thing. Mhmm. And oftentimes, it's so overtaxed. To your point, you're still focused on this, you know, first order thinking instead of second order thinking.

[1:03:11](https://realalpha.app/v/e-OELl_818g/?t=3791) You're not thinking as strategically, as holistically, and sometimes that could be the things that really take you the next 10 x in your career versus just always getting that incremental gain. Well, Renee, this has been an absolute masterclass. Thanks so much for jumping and joining me again. Thanks, David. I enjoyed it.
