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Baylor Endowment on Rethinking Venture Capital, Concentrated Portfolios, and Power of Compounding

Renee Hanna says Baylor can compound private-market returns through repeatable expansion-capital wins and concentrated commitments to trusted managers.

How I Invest · David Weisburd

  • Renee Hanna is a Managing Director of Investments at Baylor University.

The best minutes

  1. 5:50Expansion capital can compound more reliably than early venture3 min
  2. 13:24A concentrated portfolio helps Baylor focus capital and timePro pick 6 min
  3. 49:31Later-stage venture can offer attractive risk-adjusted returns3 min

Also worth watching

  1. 1:22Seed valuations have weakened Baylor’s case for early-stage venture5 min
  2. 11:07Baylor seeks upside without depending on power-law returns3 min
  3. 26:58Baylor requires a 15% net IRR to justify illiquidity3 min
  4. 36:11Baylor sees room for data-rich software firms to adopt AI3 min
  5. 43:41Active managers should move capital toward stronger opportunities5 min

Skip the LP peer-network discussion, the AI-career chat, the SpaceX funding history, and the later behavioral-finance discussion.

Full analysis · 6 min read

Real Alpha · Nov 17

Renee Hanna says repeatable threefold returns can compound to 27x

  • Threefold returns repeated every five years can compound to 27x over fifteen years in Hanna's example.
  • That math checks, but the transcript gives no realized fund series or full fee and loss record.
  • Allocators should test net results, liquidity paths, and manager workload before copying the strategy.

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6:42

Baylor built a growth lane around overlooked expansion deals

Baylor rebuilt its private portfolio from scratch in 2014, without legacy stakes in Sequoia or Benchmark. Hanna says that constraint led Baylor to seek growth differently.

Expansion capital is a blurry category, she says. Some assets were orphaned by venture funds because they sat outside major hubs or served smaller markets.

Hanna says those assets could have enterprise values below $100 million, with potential exits through acquisitions or sales to larger private equity sponsors. That context matters when comparing them with early venture.

For example, within Baylor's venture book, some funds have venture in their names but only eight to ten companies. Those companies have about $5 million in annual recurring revenue and grow north of 50% yearly.

Hanna says these groups can hold closer to 30% ownership and have lower loss ratios than early-stage managers. She describes their target as repeatable three-to-five-times returns over three to five years.

“repeatable process of getting that three to 5X in three to five years”
8:22

Our read

Baylor found growth exposure in a less crowded part of private markets. But the company profile she describes belongs to particular venture-book managers, not all expansion funds.

8:47

Hanna's 27x figure is a compounding scenario

Hanna contrasts a hypothetical 15x return over fifteen years with threefold gains repeated every five years. She says the latter would leave Baylor with a 27x multiple.

Her stated 3×3×3 checks out to 27x. But she offers it as a comparison, not a reported Baylor result, and gives no fund-vintage table behind the example.

She says expansion managers have lower loss ratios than early-stage funds, but provides no figure. The transcript also does not detail fees, distributions, or losses across the example's three periods.

Jason Lemkin said on 20VC in October 2026 that high seed prices and smaller allocations weaken seed return math. That supports Hanna's concern about entry prices, not expansion managers' realized performance.

Matthew Harris said on How I Invest in October 2026 that rejecting deals for seeming expensive can systematically miss power-law companies. Christian Garrett said on Sourcery in November 2026 that power-law winners can justify premium prices.

“I'm sitting on a 27X multiple.”
8:47

Our read

The multiplication is sound, but it cannot establish that managers will repeat those gains net of fees and losses. The other investors describe the cost of screening out potential outliers.

28:26

Baylor prices illiquidity against public equity

Hanna says private investments must clear a 15% net IRR to justify illiquidity. Baylor's portfolio is 45% private investments and 55% marketable alternatives, a mix she says has held for a couple of years.

She grounds the hurdle in long-term public-equity returns and an additional return margin. She cites six percent public equity, 350 basis points above that, and another five percent for illiquidity.

Using Hanna's stated inputs, our sum is six percent plus 350 basis points plus five percent, or 14.5 percent. She still states a 15% hurdle, without explaining the difference.

That hurdle and the university's spending rate are separate constraints. Hanna says the five percent spending rate supports operations and scholarships, making wild return swings difficult to absorb.

In a separate June 30, 2026 example, Hanna says Baylor came in at 19% without SpaceX exposure. That one period cannot establish stable performance.

Our read

The hurdle is a decision rule, not a guarantee of returns. The separate spending obligation helps explain why Baylor wants upside without wild portfolio swings.

16:04

Fewer relationships let Baylor concentrate capital and attention

Hanna says Baylor has three people on its private team, and each new line item adds work. Diligence also means spending time with managers and attending annual meetings.

Baylor's top twenty private names grew from about $100 million five years earlier to roughly $250 million, or about 25% of the overall portfolio. Hanna says the concentration is deliberate.

Take the annual budget of $160 million and capacity for typically one new GP. Baylor maps portfolio gaps first, then takes meetings that match those priorities, including an identified healthcare underweight.

Hanna says commitments to trusted managers can grow from $20 million in one fund to $40 million in a subsequent fund. The team does not require every manager to rank at the top of each vintage.

Matthew Harris said on How I Invest in October 2026 that Bain keeps venture pacing even, investing $500 million annually to avoid chasing cycles. That addresses timing, while Baylor's approach focuses on manager count and attention.

Our read

Concentration can direct both capital and diligence toward chosen relationships. It also makes manager selection more consequential, while even pacing addresses a different risk.

50:03

Baylor finds later-stage rounds more attractive

Hanna says Baylor has moved from almost no later-stage exposure to finding some deals more attractive. She is not saying the endowment is piling in at current prices.

Her target remains three to five times in three to five years, with product-market fit and growth making outcomes more visible. For direct co-investments, Baylor also wants a clear path to an IPO or acquisition.

Hanna says Baylor will not lock up capital in one co-investment for twelve to fifteen years. Shorter duration can make a lower multiple compelling if the return still meets its target.

In Hanna's SpaceX example, investors entering in 2017 got a return like 75x. She says the shorter duration made their IRR very similar to early investors.

But that is one company's history, not evidence that later-stage venture broadly delivers comparable returns. Hanna's point is that Baylor need not be a first mover when a later round offers enough upside.

“We don't have to shoot for the fences and be a first mover.”
52:24

Our read

Later-stage investing fits Baylor's preference for more evidence and a shorter wait. The SpaceX comparison illustrates the case, but does not establish a general return pattern.

44:24

Active review frees capital when the thesis weakens

Hanna describes reviewing a legacy manager's portfolio, which she expected to show zero growth over the next five years. Baylor contacted secondary brokers, tested the market, and accepted a bid.

She says the sale made sense even at a discount to Baylor's 15% cost of capital because it accelerated liquidity. The transcript gives neither the sale price nor the realized return.

She also says GPs should consider selling laggards and redirecting reserves toward stronger companies. Holding a weak asset can consume capital and time, while selling can surrender future recovery.

AI offers another case for reviewing companies individually rather than applying a sector label. Hanna says software firms with proprietary data and trusted customer relationships may adapt, and Baylor added to software at the start of the year.

She does not say every software incumbent will survive. Her view is that established software and AI-native businesses can both succeed, leaving company-level results to test the thesis.

Our read

Baylor's strategy requires ongoing judgment, not just concentrated commitments. Its willingness to sell and reconsider software positions reflects that same company-by-company review.

What it means for you

  1. Audit net multiples. Request vintage-level net IRR, losses, distributions, and fund life for expansion managers. Compare them with early-stage results rather than relying on a headline multiple.
  2. Separate hurdle inputs. Write down the public-equity alternative, illiquidity premium, and spending requirement separately. Check each assumption against your own cash needs.
  3. Count relationship load. Measure active GP relationships and the hours they require. Test whether each new commitment fills a documented portfolio gap.
  4. Re-underwrite reserves. Review follow-on capital against current company evidence, not just existing ownership. Record what would make you add, sell, or hold.

What to watch

  • Whether expansion managers repeat three-to-five-times returns after fees and losses.
  • Whether later-stage investments meet Baylor's three-to-five-year target at their entry prices.
  • Whether secondary sales release capital without surrendering material future value.

Send this to the investment committee and the team managing private-market commitments.

8:22

Watch the minute where Hanna links repeated threefold returns to 27x.

Written by Real Alpha from the episode's transcript and the other moments it links, then checked against the transcript. Quotes are the speaker's exact words.

Minute by minute

  1. 0:00Baylor rebuilt without legacy venture exposure

    Hanna says Baylor rebuilt its portfolio from scratch beginning in 2014, without legacy exposure to early-stage firms such as Sequoia or Benchmark. She says a $5,000,000 check would not move a $2,700,000,000 endowment's returns much, while each new manager adds work for a lean team.

  2. 1:22Seed valuations challenge early-stage venture math

    Hanna says seed entry prices have risen, with an average price closer to $700,000,000, making it harder to achieve the returns Baylor needs. She says the team favors specialized managers with an edge in areas such as FinTech or digital health, and is more comfortable investing later, after product-market fit.

  3. 3:20Co-investments require a clear liquidity path

    Hanna says Baylor typically co-invests through GPs it already backs, relying on their research and a visible route to an IPO or M&A. She says Baylor avoids tying up capital in one co-investment for 12 to 15 years and looks for a 3 to 5x outcome within 3 to 5 years. Early- and later-stage venture each account for roughly 10% of the portfolio, with the balance in expansion capital and lower-middle-market buyouts.

  4. 5:50Expansion capital targets overlooked companies

    Hanna says Baylor leaned into expansion capital because it lacked legacy venture holdings and found overlooked companies that venture managers might pass over for being outside major hubs or having smaller markets. She says these businesses can enter at an enterprise value below $100,000,000, with multiple exit paths. Baylor allocates closer to 30% to expansion capital, versus 2% in the Burgess benchmark.

  5. 11:35Concentration supports a steady-return strategy

    Hanna says Baylor values consistent returns and wants to protect against losses while retaining some upside. She says fewer manager relationships let the team focus on its strongest GPs; Baylor has 20 private names that matter, and its top 20 account for about 25% of the overall portfolio.

  6. 17:38A finite budget narrows GP sourcing

    Hanna says Baylor deploys $160,000,000 in a calendar year and typically has capacity to add one new GP. The team maps portfolio gaps, such as being underweight healthcare, then takes meetings in those priority areas rather than maintaining an open door for every strategy. She says that focus saves time for both Baylor and GPs.

  7. 21:30GP concentration signals conviction

    Hanna says she likes when GPs put substantial capital behind their strongest ideas, because that concentration can signal conviction and drive closer attention to a company. She says Baylor's LP network is collaborative but also competitive, with peers tracking how their endowments compare.

  8. 25:48Private investments must clear a 15% hurdle

    Hanna says Baylor is risk-conscious because its 5% spending rate supports the university's operating budget and scholarships. She says private investments must generate a 15% net IRR to justify illiquidity. Baylor arrived at that hurdle by starting with a 6% public-equity return assumption, adding 350 basis points, and layering in another 5% for illiquidity.

  9. 30:50Venture platforms may keep scaling

    Hanna expects venture platforms to grow and companies to stay private longer, leaving a market split between early-stage specialists and very large platforms. She says three of Baylor's top GPs converging on the same later-stage company was a signal she paid attention to when evaluating the opportunity.

  10. 36:22AI and legacy software can coexist

    Hanna says some legacy software companies will fail to adapt, but others have their own data and customers willing to test AI products through existing providers. She says Baylor has continued to back software managers whose strongest companies are making that transition, and that AI-native businesses and software companies can both succeed.

  11. 40:25Judgment and relationships remain valuable

    Hanna advises students to build authentic relationships through follow-up and thoughtful gestures, rather than treating networking as transactional. She says investors still need to understand a model and judge its results, even if AI can build it. For her, the ability to think and make a call matters alongside efficiency.

  12. 43:41Active exits can improve portfolio construction

    Hanna says Baylor tested the secondary market on a manager's portfolio after seeing little expected growth over five years, then accepted a compelling bid to accelerate liquidity. She says GPs should sell companies that are unlikely to meet their underwriting and shift reserves toward winners, rather than treating follow-on capital as automatic.

  13. 49:31Late-stage venture offers a clearer risk profile

    Hanna says Baylor has moved from almost no late-stage venture exposure to looking more closely at companies with product-market fit, visibility, and growth. She says the target remains 3 to 5x in 3 to 5 years. Weisburd cites a 75x return for later SpaceX investors, and Hanna says the shorter holding period made that kind of outcome attractive.

  14. 55:31Contrarian investing takes discipline and reflection

    Hanna says Baylor has become more comfortable holding a view against the market while continuing to revisit its thesis; she thinks being in Waco can reduce the pressure of constant peer chatter. She says she would tell her earlier self to make more face-to-face meetings that are not with GPs and to leave time to think. She also favors GPs who keep fund growth disciplined and build lasting LP relationships.

Published Nov 16, 2026.

Transcript · 56 min read

How I Invest, hosted by David Weisburd, with Renee Hanna.

From the transcript How I Invest publishes with the episode.

  1. As we were rebuilding the portfolio effectively from scratch beginning in 2014, we didn't have the benefit of having legacy exposure to early stage names. We didn't have Sequoia. We didn't have Benchmark. Because we didn't have that luxury, we had to go down a different path of trying to create upside and capture growth exposure in the portfolio in a different way. People often talk about this saying that the fund size is a strategy for GP, but it also seems to be the strategy for the LP as well. Absolutely. We're trying to construct a portfolio. And so if I can get into a great name and it's only a $5,000,000 check size on a $2,700,000,000 endowment, I'm not sure that I care.

  2. Right? It doesn't move the needle. And we are also operating with a lean team. We've got three people on the private team, three people on the marketable team, three people on the ops team. Every time you add a new line item, you're effectively, like, increasing the workload for everybody else. And so you want it to count. So you have this front row seat. Endowments are arguably the sexiest and the most attractive LPs, so you get to meet with a lot of the managers. You're talking to a lot of the start ups as Today, Venture is roughly $3,500,000,000,000 asset. Five years from now, is that number higher?

  3. The platforms will continue to grow and get bigger and scale. I think that companies saying private longer is not gonna go away. I think you'll continue to have kind of a bifurcation in the market where you've got these early stage specialists that are playing coupled with, these very large platforms. Being in Waco, Texas and chatting with you multiple times, you have several very contrarian views. What's another thing that you disagree with your other health peers? There's a lot of Renee, you're managing director of private equity at Baylor University, has $2,700,000,000 under management.

Read the whole transcript
  1. Renee Hanna · 5 min

    “For us, the biggest hurdle is just the entry valuations have changed so much at the pre seed and seed stage rounds.”

  2. You're a managing director of private equity, so you're really focused on private equity as a whole. Seems like you've really gone into two different directions. One is venture capital, and one is lower middle market.

  3. Renee Hanna · 3 min

    “They're getting access to these companies where there's 5,000,000 in ARR, scaling at north of 50% per annum”

  4. As I like to remind people, 3x over twenty years is not a good return. People are so focused on multiple, they just forget about IRR. And especially for taxable investor like Baylor, the compounding is massive. Yeah. Absolutely. A three x is not interesting over a twenty year period. I'm fascinated by going after these these companies. In many ways, it's a counter thesis.

  5. So Marc Andreessen famously says, we're in a consensus market. There's no more diamonds in the rough, only diamonds. What that invariably says is that there's a large part of the market, the majority, probably 90% plus of startups, especially those funded before 2023, are just not impressive enough, are not growing two x every quarter that that gets the interest of the venture capital markets today, the the large funds. So invariably, there's hundreds, if not thousands, of these companies. I think one of the most underappreciated aspect of that is there's a huge opportunity cost of the board member's time.

  6. If you're a board member at Excel or Andreessen Horowitz and you invest into some kind of SaaS company that was triple triple doubling, which was really the criteria a couple years ago. And now because of that board seat, you're not able to invest in the next Cursor or the next OpenAI. You would give up a lot just to get out of that position. And I love that. Like, I hope that that's what's going on because I'd love for our expansion capital managers to swoop in and be the ones who participate in that triple triple double that's not interesting to a venture. It's almost like a secondary in that you're solving somebody's problems.

  7. Correct, yes. Yeah, absolutely. Structural alpha. Absolutely. And oftentimes we see once they get access to these companies, they find that the GP is a really good partner and the founder enjoys working with them. So there's lots of opportunities to preempt the round where the founder can continue to focus on their day job. The GP can step in and provide a financing round, and they can go about their business. And it's also, one of the value add that they bring is the connectivity to other GPs, larger GPs. And there's a lot of private equity capital out there. Over the last five years, capital commitments have stabilized at roughly 1,500,000,000,000.

  8. There's a ton of dry powder to go in that needs a place to invest. And effectively, we are creating product for large buyout to invest in. Sitting where you're sitting today, three weeks ago, had Matt Harris from Bain Capital Ventures.

  9. Renee Hanna · 3 min

    “we very much want to defend zero. And we recognize that in doing so, you necessarily might cap your upside.”

  10. Is it still difficult to access those names? It's still difficult to get into the early stage products with the size that we want.

  11. Renee Hanna · 6 min

    “Today, it's closer to two fifty, so approximately 25% of the overall portfolio.”

  12. But it's a waste of everyone's time for us to take that meeting.

  13. I think this obsession with optionality, whether it's venture capitalists, keeping startups kind of pitching and never saying no to them because there's this one in 1,000 chance that they might turn around and invest. Right. And same with the LPs and GPs. I I think it's one of the big logical fallacies for a couple of reasons. One is, first of all, like, there's opportunity cost to talking to that one in 10,000 chance company. You could be talking to somebody that might be a one in 10 chance. And secondly, and perhaps most more importantly, is your reputation. It's a it's a recurring game. So if you have this reputation that you're always stringing people along, it's not gonna take long before founders talk to each other, and they're gonna not not include you in the hottest companies.

  14. Absolutely. We're not perfect. We try to be really transparent, and let people know what we're thinking. And I hope that that translate... That when Baylor says, we're leaning in, we would really love for you to to secure an allocation of $20,000,000, we're taking it to our board for a full recommendation that they know we're gonna come through. And we do. I want Baylor to be the place where people come. It's like they do what they say they're going to do. It's how you get the first call. Yes. Absolutely. One thing I've learned from talking to hundreds of investors is that great investment firms aren't built on investment returns alone.

  15. The firms under are great at the things most people don't see, their operations, their relationship with LPs, and the quality of information they use to make decisions. And here's what AI has changed. Every firm now has access to the very same models, so the intelligence isn't the edge anymore. The edge is what you could feed it. Firm with its fund operations and data in one connected record can actually put AI to work. A firm running on disconnected systems simply can't. That's why thousands of GPs run their funds on Juniper Square. Juniper Square puts your fund operations, data, and administration together in one connected record.

  16. That means less time managing disconnected systems and more time investing, working with LPs, and building your firm. This episode is brought to you by Juniper Square, the operations partner for private market GPs. Learn more at junipersquare.com/howiinvest. That's junipersquare.com/howiinvest. Going from concentration in your portfolio to the concentration of some of these largest companies in the portfolio of venture capital managers, it's also downstream of this consensus market, is these funds piling in massive amounts of capital into the winners. What do you think about that? And what's your mental framework for thinking about concentration within specific managers?

  17. I actually love concentration in GPs. I want a GP to invest in their best ideas. And effectively, it's what we're doing within the private investment portfolio and across the Baylor University portfolio at large, even on the marketable side. That angst of when you're putting a ton of capital to work behind a single name, you're probably gonna be really thoughtful about each incremental dollar. And I hope that it keeps you up at night because if it blows up, it's a problem. Right? And I love that because I think that means you're probably going to pay attention to the details. You're probably going to be on the phone and have a really tight relationship with the founder.

  18. You're not going to sit it and forget it. You're going to be paying attention to what happens with that name. And if you're willing to put 20% of your capital, 30% of your capital plus into a given name because you believe in it, I suspect you're investing with significant conviction behind it, and I can get on board with that. I think that's how you add alpha. It's a strong signal. The concentration itself is the signal. Absolutely. Scott Wilson, famous CIO of University of wash... Washington, St. Louis, he would actually go to the managers that are at their concentration limit, and he would say, could we get more money into those opportunities?

  19. Because he realized that, a, those were their highest convicted bet. And, b, there's only so much career risk that a GP could take. Because everything's probabilistic. Let's say that you're in SpaceX. You love Elon Musk. You... This is ten years ago. You you believe totally in his mission. There's still some 10, 20, 30% chance that the entire business fails. Mhmm. And even Elon Musk will be the first one to to admit this. So you can't put in 50 of your fund, although some people have done that. Mhmm. It's worked out really well for them. But you shouldn't really do that. You still wanna manage your portfolio, have some kind of portfolio construction, some kind of diversification.

  20. But if you put 20% of your fund in, that's a very interesting signal for the LP to come in and say, well, we actually want more of that. Mhmm. That's a bit counterintuitive. It's a great point. I... We have a lot of respect for Scott Wilson and what he's built at Washington University. They've killer portfolio, really great returns, and very thoughtful investors. Speaking of your peers, LPs are often these mythical creatures. I I obviously bring in a a lot to to share their views, but a lot of people don't know what goes on kinda behind the curtain in terms of LP to LP relationships. Are you meeting with other allocators as well?

  21. And what do you guys talk about? The LP network is really friendly and really collaborative. And I think at the end of the day, if endowments and foundations have good returns, it ultimately translates to more students going to school, more people in higher education. And it feels like a really collaborative network of peers and feel very fortunate with the network that I've built over my career at Baylor. And then at the same time, I also feel like we're pretty scrappy and love to win. Right? Like when the new Kubo report comes out, we're absolutely looking at it, as I'm sure all of my peers are, to see where we rank compared to those schools that we have an affinity for or closely aligned to in AUM, you know, respect.

  22. We mentioned Scott Wilson, but we're definitely paying attention to how other schools are doing and how we compare on a relative basis. There's a form of co opetition. Friendly co... Friendly competition. Absolutely. It always befuddled me that people can't come and be competitive with someone else or collaborative. When I am competitive or collaborative, I say, hey. Here are the 20% of the places where we're competitive. Mhmm. Let me call it out. Let me put this on a piece of paper. Let's talk about the other 80%. There's no... This is zero sum right here. We're competing for the same opportunities, same businesses.

  23. That's totally fine. How do we collaborate on the other 80%? And I think just just bringing in kind of that... This transparency and this, like, I mean, just just naming what it is. It is coopetition could be very powerful. A 100%. And I played softball growing up. I played a little bit, in college, and my favorite people to play and ultimately beat were, like, your biggest rivals. Right? You had the most respect for them. A lot of them ended up being your friends because you've been playing them for years. And I think that competition is healthy. Like, you really show up when you're playing those games.

  24. And so I think the element of competition is, a powerful driver. And we're all pretty competitive in the office, especially Dave and I. One of the things I've been thinking about since... For the last 360 episodes since we last chatted is your reputation of being concentrated, your reputation of being a true alpha investor. You would think most endowments would want to do that. But at the same time, you see a lot of endowments being conservative. So I'm wondering, what is it that gets your team to be more aggressive and more risk taking versus some of your peers? We're thoughtful about the risks that we take.

  25. I wouldn't describe us as being like super high risk takers. In fact, I think we're the opposite. I think we're actually a pretty risk averse bunch, and so we have to push ourselves to take more risk on the margins. But I think there's risks that we're willing to take. Right? And concentration is one of them. To your point about leaning in with conviction, we've gotten very comfortable leaning into the best ideas of GPs that we trust, And it's worked out well for us. At the same time, when you look at the risk return metrics of our portfolio, we've done a really good job protecting the portfolio to the downside, and that's paid off well.

  26. So, think both things can be true, where you're thoughtful about the risk that you're taking and where you add alpha, and still preserve the value of the portfolio so that you don't have wild swings in returns.

  27. Renee Hanna · 3 min

    “Anything coming into the private investment portfolio has a line in the sand of generating a 15% net IRR.”

  28. A lot of people discovered this in 2022. They had 60 to 40 portfolios, and then they had 40% bonds. And because bonds weren't returning enough, they went lower and lower in the quality up to basically junk bonds. Mhmm. And then lo and behold, now they're almost one to one correlated with equities. So what you basically had is correlation to equities but a lower return Mhmm.

  29. Versus historically, bonds were supposed to be kind of negatively correlated to equity. So you want to be careful that there's these obvious traps that people get into when they misuse the asset for what it's intended to do. Yeah, absolutely. You know, and I think the genesis of private credit and private financing and how large that that market has grown ties into private companies staying longer because they necessarily have, greater optionality for access to capital that they didn't have. So you don't have to tap into the public markets. You can maintain control of your business for longer.

  30. You can have more autonomy. And it makes sense that companies are choosing to stay private longer than they were in the past because of the availability of capital that didn't used to exist, at least not in the same fashion as today. Speaking of the private markets, you have this front row seat. Endowments are arguably the sexiest and the most attractive LPs, so you get to meet with a lot of the managers. You're talk... You're talking to a lot of the start ups as well. Today, venture is roughly $3,500,000,000,000 asset. Five years from now, is that number higher? Is that number lower? What do you make a sense as a whole of the venture asset class?

  31. I think that the platforms will continue to grow and get bigger and scale. I think that companies saying private longer is not gonna go away. I think you'll continue to have kind of a bifurcation in the market where you've got these early stage specialists that are playing coupled with, these very large platforms. I came to the same conclusion when I had Matt Witthiler from Wellington. And he told me that the public markets have the equivalent of a 127,000,000,000,000. So 3,500,000,000,000, a 127,000,000,000,000. So that's at a high level. And then you double click and you look at what's going on in the private markets and the venture capital markets specifically.

  32. Q one twenty twenty six, 76% of all venture capital money went into five names. Mhmm. Which goes back to this kind of concentration question, which is how how con... How diversified are you if you're in venture capital as a whole? But another side effect of that is that there was no more money to be had for these five companies. So if you're Anthropic, OpenAI, SpaceX, there's an argument that there's just not enough private capital in the world to fund an... Another round. Said another way, if you did another round in some of these companies, you would be deploying now a 100% Mhmm. Of all private capital.

  33. In my sense, dealing with a lot of founders is the most ambitious founders would, all things being equal, would love to stay private longer. Mhmm. I think even SpaceX, I believe they're twenty four years into being private. Elon would have stayed public for even longer if he... Would have stayed private for even longer if he had chance. I I think they just exhausted the private markets. So if you look at ground truth, you know, venture capital is this access class where the founders choose the GPs and the top GPs choose the LPs. And if you look at the ground truth, which are the top founders, all things being equal, if there are 7,000,000,000,000 in the market, yes, it might still go to the same five companies.

  34. But I think Anthropix, OpenAI, SpaceX, a lot of these companies would perpetually be private because they just love the idea of being able to think long term, not being subject to the quarterly financials, not being subject to all the other negative externalities that come to being a public company. I suspect the minute you turn into a public founder, the game completely changes. I also think there's some king making going on in terms of the amount of capital and where the dollars are going, but I also think it's real. Love to hear your thoughts. But capital as a moat definitely seems to be kind of cementing the winners as they evolve.

  35. I think there's a lot of different perspectives on that. One is I think you have to distinct between businesses that are data driven and token driven versus other businesses. Mhmm. So at some point in the near future, it might be sooner than most people realize, human beings are gonna be surpassed their intelligence by AI, which means that it's gonna be a matter downstream of token usage, how well a company is run, how how good of a strategy it has versus the talent, which is a little bit scary to think about. It is. But that... That's one side of it. And then the exact opposite is also true, which is if you don't have a capital intensive business and you could vibe code your website over the weekend, what is your moat?

  36. Mhmm. And now you look at data, you look at training data, and you look at customers and different aspects that could be moats. But a lot of the moats end up being capital in nature. So then the question becomes, well, would... Is this company successful because it raised a lot of capital, or did it raise a lot of capital because it's successful? And I think it's a combination of that. It showed early signals that it was gonna be the winner, and then a bunch of capital came in and essentially made it self self fulfilling. Mhmm. I agree. It's interesting to see how the market plays out. I mean, we see it in our portfolio.

  37. We invested in a co investment recently. It was a later stage round. It's not something that we normally do, but it was sourced from one of our top GPs in the portfolio and got very comfortable with the opportunity set and the trajectory from here. And we ultimately had three of our top GPs that were coalescing around this name, which gave us even additional comfort. But there was a very consistent thesis, a lot of capital chasing it, and, it was just interesting to see three of our top GPs going after the same play. If I'm honest, that's a signal that I really pay attention to. Mhmm. It's almost like the rule of marketing.

  38. The... It's almost like the rule of seven in marketing, which the first three times you ignore something. And then by the time it's the fifth time you go to the website, and then the seventh time, like, what the hell is this company? Should be paying attention. Okay. The first two people, it was interesting that they mentioned it. By the fifth time, it's like, this is clearly consensus. So now I have to... It basically forces me as a VC to make a decision. Is the entire market... Is the consensus market wrong? Mhmm. Or are they right and and I should invest in it? So this kind of... This... The...

  39. Just hearing through the zeitgeist and hearing through your relationship about about a name is is such an underrated aspect of investing. Yeah. And that's definitely how we felt. It was... This isn't something we normally do. It was a very short fuse, but it felt like we should pay attention to this. And ultimately, we got to the finish line on it, and I feel really good about it. We're all very excited to bring that exposure into the portfolio.

  40. Renee Hanna · 3 min

    “And the customer is very comfortable with them pushing out and testing AI products through their software provider.”

  41. I had David Breach, who runs Vista Equity now. And, of course, I had to ask him about the SaaS apocalypse and the future of software.

  42. And one of the trends that he sees across his entire portfolio is that software is going from something that you plug in and almost use it as a user to actually done for you, so services component. Mhmm. So instead of now going into your CRM and you're saying, well, let me put in the notes, and here here here, I met with Renee. Here's kind of what we talked about. It already is gathering information from our Zoom call, and it's already making strategic decisions. Oh, I... You should follow-up in three months. And it's almost becoming and replacing the knowledge worker versus just being a software.

  43. And I think that's where a lot of the top software companies are evolving to. Mhmm. It's more of an agentic approach where you have an agent because that's very valuable. Yeah. Because if you could actually take away spend from your human capital and expand that human capital and make every every employee three to five times more productive, how much is that worth versus an application that you may or may not use that you log in every couple months? So just having an agentic part of your team that's helping you execute, I think, is probably a highly underrated aspect of the software market today.

  44. It's very early innings. And so from an employment base and trying to understand like where the job shift is going to be, I think it's too soon to tell. I don't think that you're seeing massive layoffs as the result of AI. I think you're seeing stabilization of employment. And so maybe you can do more with less and you don't need to add that new person that you were going to add this calendar year. Maybe you add them next calendar year and you can hire every couple of years instead of every year. Perhaps it's you're adding people at a slower rate. If I was graduating right now from college, it'd be a difficult time to decide, like, where is the best place for me to go.

  45. Right? I think things are shifting, and I think we'll probably have more clarity over the next five to ten years. But I think right now, it's a bit murky. I just had my first child, so I'm not yet worried You have about time. You have Give give me your No, the way. Thank you. But you you obviously... You're on university. You're actually on campus. You're dealing with students. I think you have student interns as well. What's advice that you're giving them? I'll tell you where I think about my value add. And in a world where AI is coming, think it goes back to that relationship component. And so one of the things we're really spending a lot of time talking through with, students and even in our office is just the relationship aspect.

  46. AI is going to be able to possibly replace a lot of things going forward, but I think it will be very difficult to replace the relationship aspect of what we've built. And so if you're a student that you're coming out of Baylor or any undergrad, really thinking about how you refine your relationships and your network in an authentic way. And I think a lot of people talk about curating a network and going to conferences and how you do that. But I actually think it's much harder in practice to do the hard things, to follow-up, to write a handwritten thank you note, to be intentional, to have it come across as authentic versus transactional.

  47. I think these are really hard things to get right over time. We spend a lot of time talking to students about the softer side of that. What about hard skills? What survives? How you would write a memo, how you would sell a memo, understanding the Black Scholes model if you're working through derivatives, and all these things that, like, I very much valued when I was getting my CFA and really curated my ability to write a good, thoughtful memo. But today, I think it would be more like the ability to think. Right? You might have an AI tool that can create an LBO model for you. But, like, can you really sit down and analyze the results And then have the wherewithal to be like, oh, you know, here's the sum of that analysis.

  48. We should add more capital or wait a minute, let's pull back. Let's let's sell this. Like, it doesn't make sense. So I think that ability to think, and I think it's going to be hard to think and analyze if you don't know how to do, right? Like if you're just letting an AI model, an AI tool build a model for you and you can't understand the results, like that's a problem, right? But I think that, at least for myself, I'm better because I know how to build the model myself. Right? So I I don't know. Like, there's a bit of a tug and a pull on efficiency, versus effectiveness. I think it's the most overused term, taste, especially among venture capitalists.

  49. But I think there's something to it. And I think being able to have taste or judgment. Mhmm. Because now, you could just accomplish things so quickly. Right. Even just down to our programming, to our thumbnails, there's certain people that know what kind of feels good and what the guests would like, what the audience would like, and other people wouldn't. And it's almost like this saying common sense is uncommon. Mhmm. It's very uncommon to have somebody both have taste, judgment, agency as well, being able to solve problems. There's a saying, do you create problems or do you solve problems? Mhmm.

  50. And that is the fastest way to rise in an organization is to solve problems and go to your boss and say, what else could I do? Mhmm. And it's just a small part of the market and a small part of the people are able to be high agency enough. A lot people look at their jobs as... They have a punch card whether they're literally using it or not. They punch in, they punch out, and hope that nobody notices them. I think it's gonna be a very difficult time for for people like that in the future. Yeah. As we think about portfolio construction and the art of building a portfolio,

  51. Renee Hanna · 5 min

    “Move it over to the thing that's working right now, because it makes sense. Right? Like you don't have to be so rigid about your reserve allocation.”

  52. Your best idea, your winner should get the capital. So one of the biggest logical fallacies is this concept in venture capital of preserving your ownership or retaining your ownership in an asset that's not great. Mhmm. It's just illogical. There's no mathematical sense. I I went down the rabbit hole. I talked to dozens of people. I was trying to see what didn't make sense, but every net new dollar that you ever invest needs to be the highest and best use of your capital. Now the counterexample, the the one good argument against it is you...

  53. If you make a promise to a founder or you're known as somebody that follows on to your companies as some of these multistage firms, there's a reputational aspect. But from purely financial standpoint, there's no such thing as defending your position or defending your pro rata. It's a completely nonsensical thing. And I think even of late, there's so much capital now in later stage rounds that I don't feel like people care as much if the early stage investor continues to follow-up. That's the paradox, is that the founders that always get upset about you lowering your allocation are the hottest companies, and the ones that really need your capital are the ones that get upset with you when when you kind of lower your pro rata.

  54. So that itself is a... I think one of the strongest signals. What have you changed your mind on since we last chatted two years ago?

  55. Renee Hanna · 3 min

    “we're very happy to jump in at a point where you have product market fit. It's been derisked.”

  56. We're investors in SpaceX in roughly that time period, in the late two thousand Okay. And... But I've known the company for a while. I've driven in Elon's Tesla, and I've known that community. And one of the things that's really interesting about SpaceX is it's gone through the entire evolution of smart and dumb money. So in the very beginning, before I knew about SpaceX or before I knew about Elon, it was the sharpest capital, Founders Fund, people like that.

  57. I remember meeting Luke Nosek when he was at Founders Fund, and he told me, I'm starting a fund to invest in SpaceX. So I'm like, tell me more. And he's like, no. That's that's it. That's it. My My pitch. Haven't seen the numbers, but I imagine it's probably the It's probably the best funds that has ever... And I thought it was crazy even at the time. I'm like, this is, like, founder level, like, conviction. I mean, it's basically an n up one. So there's people like that. And then for probably a decade, probably longer, it was a family office trade, which, at least at the time, was a very nice way of saying, not the smartest people, people that wanted to say, I invested in SpaceX.

  58. I invested in rockets. A lot of institutional investors did not invest for a while. And then again, it became a smart money trade post Starlink. You know, people like Justin was... Fischner Wolfson, who was there from the beginning, but he started saying, you know, there's this free free walk to a trillion dollar valuation because of Starlink, and it became this highly rational thing. And then you had to get access again. It became an access play Mhmm. Just like I I imagine it was at their earliest stages. But it's interesting these companies go through these entire life cycles. And, frankly, it's Founders Fund that had these really interesting conversations across their entire portfolio, which is sometimes going in the seed is very rational.

  59. Sometimes passing on the series a on the same company is very rational. Passing on the b, and then going into the c Mhmm. Is very rational. So reunderwriting the companies from first principles every single round is what the the best investors do, and it's it's an unusual, and it's cognitively expensive thing to say, well, we're smart to invest before, but now this is dumb. And now we passed on it twice, and now it's smart again. Mhmm. It takes a lot of humility and a lot of mental energy to really do the... Do this gymnastics and re underwrite companies from first principles. It does. It's very hard to to re underwrite.

  60. And I think humility is a great way to put it, to say no, and be like, Oh, now is a good time. The persistence of it and having the wherewithal to stay close to the hoop enough to do that underwriting, I don't think a lot of people do that. So I think it's very impressive when somebody has the persistence and the tenacity to continue to grind a deal until it makes sense. And I think also, speaking from personal experience, once you've missed out on a deal or passed on a deal, you almost start rooting against it. Mhmm. And just... You have to capitalize that loss and say, well, I lost the the previous five x.

  61. I still think there's a 10 x from here, and it's just a hard cognitive thing. You almost start, like, rooting against it. Yeah. I I don't have ill will towards companies, but it's... I just observe that mentally. You just almost start to be an anti fan of the company because you have to justify that I didn't make a mistake. I made the rational decision at that point. It always surprises me how real behavioral finance is. I wish I would have spent more time taking those classes in undergrad. But, in real life and in practice, I mean, just the human behavior of trading and trading mentality is such a real thing that impacts valuations and trades and how we behave and portfolio management.

  62. Yeah. It's a very It's also one of the things that's not really priced into a market. So not only is it real, oftentimes there's alpha there. I'm curious now in your career, what are some behavioral finance things that you've fixed in yourself? Just like that fear of missing out, right? I think with time, you get more comfortable being contrarian. And I think I've learned from one of the best. Our CIO, Dave, is really great at looking at the data, coming up with a perspective, and being willing to be unemotional about it. Even, you know, you could be wrong for some time before you're right, but like continuing to revisit the thesis, does it still make sense?

  63. And investing with conviction whenever you have a view. And I think that that muscle develops with time. It's just not something that's supernatural to just completely go against the grain. And I think we also benefit from being in the middle of the country, in Waco, Texas, right? Like we're not able to just like walk to a cocktail party like you can in New York City. Right? Like, it's very different for us. And so then you don't hear a lot of that chatter. And it would probably be a little bit harder to be contrarian if you're constantly being reinforced by your peers, like how dumb your idea is.

  64. Right? And then being proven that your idea is dumb because that year, what you invested in underperformed everything else that they did, right? Like it's probably harder to continue to have that conviction. And so I think we have a benefit of where we sit in the country that we didn't used to believe was a superpower that now we do. For me, it's been something that I've gotten better at in time as you've seen pattern recognition and just get more comfort in your ability to, make investment decisions. On this promo point, an underrated behavioral finance issue that I see over and over, and this is the worst possible outcome for investors, is they're smart enough but not disciplined enough to execute on the strategy.

  65. What does that mean? That means they see a hype cycle, they pass on the series a, and they pass on the series b. At some point, they lack the discipline. Mhmm. It's been worn down, and then they come in at the pre IPO round. Mhmm. And then it falls down like a WeWork. Yeah. And then they were smart enough to know that it was probably a hype cycle or that it was a bad company, but they weren't disciplined enough to hold the line and to continue saying no. And I think it's one of the... These common things they see smart people do... One of these mistakes that smart people do is that they they don't have enough conviction to follow through the entire life cycle of a company.

  66. Mhmm. I see it too on the, GP side. Obviously, we're very sensitive to fund sizes, and I think the smaller your fund, generally speaking, it ends up being a better multiple for LPs, which is the goal for us, right, to have an ultimately better fund outcome. And the exclusivity a GP can garner and build to create that FOMO from LPs to be like, here's my hard cap. It's two fifty. Like, you're in or you're out, and you might not make the cut. And the amount of, like, access constraint that that brings versus being like, hey, I'm gonna raise my hard cap from two fifty to three fifty. Okay. Well, now it's gonna be 400 because this other group wants in.

  67. Can I have an extension so that they can continue to vet this opportunity versus being like, no, I'm gonna take care of the existing LPs that got me here? To the extent where we grow, it's gonna be modest, and I'm gonna have room for one or two LPs. And I'm going to curate the landscape of those LPs that are going be more aligned with me. And I will invite you in if we have capacity for you. LPs love that. If I'm a GP, that's my strategy as I'm fundraising. But we see so many groups that fall subject to the LP demand. And it tends to be shortsighted because the minute your returns are lackluster, those LPs are not going to be there.

  68. Versus the ones who believe in your strategy, they actually might give you another chance if it's like, lessons did you learn from these missteps? What are you gonna do to fix it going forward? That capital will probably be stickier. It goes back to who's willing to play the long term games. Exactly. Yes. Long term games compound, but going back to this previous issue, you need to have the conviction. You need to have the patience. And that is, in many ways, a lot of the things that separates the top 50% versus the top 10% venture capitalists. I've never met a venture capitalist that was not smart by by the average population standard.

  69. They're oftentimes top 10%, top 5%. But what oftentimes separates them is work ethic, but also just conviction, long termism. And these are these are things that is very difficult to to teach. I think it goes back to kind of when kindergarteners have have the the marshmallow test. I think it really goes back to that. And some people have it, some people don't. Last time we chatted, I asked you, if you could go back to when you had first started at Baylor, and you could give yourself one timeless piece of advice, what would that be? It would be to have more face to face meetings that aren't with GPs.

  70. So I didn't really start doing that until later in my career. And actually, on this trip, I am attending a couple of AGMs. But I've also sprinkled in several meetings where I'm just catching up with a friend in the industry that I haven't seen in a while or meeting with the CIO at another university and created space to do that versus before, I would say, I need to jam my calendar with 10 different meetings. I'm going go see 10 different GPs, and not thinking about the value that that creates when you're just like going back to the network effects and your relationship. I wish I would have started curating that earlier on and just understanding the benefits of creating space when you travel to just like let these meetings percolate.

  71. When you're back to back to back, then you have to like cut the conversation off because you didn't allow space. For type A people, you can be very high charging, which is, I would put myself in that category where you're like, need to do, do, do, do, do. To get that dopamine reinforcement. Instead of just, it's okay to just, like, sit here, think, have a nice conversation, ask where they're going for vacation. Because the dividends, that pays back when you pick up the phone and you're like, Hey, just met with this GP and I think they might be in your bubble. Like, what do you really think about them?

  72. Right? Like that pays off if you can get, one nugget of information that you wouldn't normally get. Right? It could really make or break the underwriting that you do or lead you down a different path to start asking different questions and help you make better decisions. To be honest, this is a systematic error I made when I was younger. I would hear these really smart people like Naval Ravikant say, well, I take a day to think. And I'm like, that is the lamest thing. Yeah. Why does he need a day to think? Why not take an hour? And now I take structure times, typically on the weekends. I'll even go to sensory deprivation tank so that my senses are restored.

  73. And then I just go out and I just sit in nature or at some park in New York City. There's not not that much nature. And just see what surfaces. Mhmm. And really kind of nonlinear benefits from that. I think about, well, maybe I should have this guest on. Maybe I think about this investment. Maybe I think about... Well, maybe me and Curtis should take an off-site old meta. You know, maybe we should go and spend time together versus just just by myself. And it's very interesting to see the subconscious as a powerful thing. Mhmm. And oftentimes, it's so overtaxed. To your point, you're still focused on this, you know, first order thinking instead of second order thinking.

  74. You're not thinking as strategically, as holistically, and sometimes that could be the things that really take you the next 10 x in your career versus just always getting that incremental gain. Well, Renee, this has been an absolute masterclass. Thanks so much for jumping and joining me again. Thanks, David. I enjoyed it.

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