The alpha, twice a week
That was 3 min.
Get the best new moments in your inbox every Wednesday and Saturday. It's free.
Check your inbox
We sent a link to your address. Click it to finish signing up. Not there in a minute? Look in spam.
or
Lex Fridman Podcast · 3 min · Nov 10, 2026
A ceasefire could leave Ukraine exposed to renewed attack
Michael Kofman argues Ukraine may demobilize while Russia keeps its contracted force, creating a dangerous gap after a ceasefire.
In this episode
Full analysis- 24:47Offensive success depends on suppressing enemy drone units5 min
- 1:03:21Analysts over-rationalized Russia's invasion planPro pick 8 min
- 1:25:58Bakhmut's symbolic value outlasted its military value6 min
- 1:34:51Russian battlefield reports can distort fire support8 min
- 2:39:20A ceasefire could leave Ukraine exposed to renewed attack3 min
- 1:47:11Political leaders may ask how to delay defeat, not win8 min
- 2:06:24The Russian military adopted Wagner's assault tactics3 min
- 2:20:56Russia is spending a large share of its economy on the war6 min
“Ukraine is very vulnerable some months after a ceasefire. Eventually, it'll have to demobilize all the men at the front line”
Michael Kofmanat 2:39:29 · Lex Fridman PodcastTakeaways
- Ukraine may need to send frontline troops back to civilian life.
- Russia's contracted force may not demobilize after a ceasefire.
- Without security guarantees, Ukraine could be vulnerable within months.
About this segment
Michael Kofman argues Ukraine may demobilize while Russia keeps its contracted force, creating a dangerous gap after a ceasefire. He points to the failed Minsk agreements as precedent.
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment
Led foundational research on Russia’s military and studies Ukrainian forces and Eurasian security at Carnegie.

Lex Fridman, Host · Host, Lex Fridman Podcast
Robotics and AI researcher at MIT; started the show in 2018.
From “Russia-Ukraine War: Putin, Zelenskyy, Trump and the Future of Warfare | Lex Fridman Podcast #504”, Nov 10, 2026. Watch the full episode
Thanks. We'll look at and fix what's off.
Transcript
Transcribed by machine (Whisper) from the episode’s audio, so a word may be off here and there.
- 2:39:24
Why won't Ukraine, why won't Russia just agree? Because ceasefires can often just become rearmament periods to renew hostilities. Ukraine is very vulnerable some months after a ceasefire. Eventually, it'll have to demobilize all the men at the front line who want to go back to their lives, to their families. Russia's force is largely contracted. Russia may not demobilize its force. And then Ukraine could be very vulnerable after a ceasefire.
- 2:39:54
It's signed six to eight months into it if there are no genuine security guarantees from the United States or anyone else. All they got was a piece of paper saying ceasefire, Russia had the opportunity to rearm, and the war is renewed. Except this time, Russia is in a much more advantaged position given how things developed after the ceasefire. And for those not familiar with this war, it starts in 2014.
- 2:40:19
And there were two failed ceasefires that never led to a political settlement, the first Minsk and the second Minsk agreement. And so naturally, those of us who are familiar with this history both want to see a ceasefire, but also wary that a ceasefire is just a piece of paper, those words on it, but doesn't lead to a lasting peace. And it's my concern that we will potentially see a third. duration of this war, that how this war ends takes us to the next one. And there are plenty of conflicts like this, wars between India and Pakistan, Arab-Israeli conflict, Armenia, Azerbaijan, where there are multiple wars in that series.
- 2:40:53
You're implying there's a low probability of success in the near term about the negotiation efforts. If it turns out that they are successful, what does that look like? What do you think? What is the the inkling of light as we search for some optimism that they are successful they get at least a partial ceasefire in place compartmentalizing this war ideally beginning with strikes against critical infrastructure by both sides maybe also in tradition strikes in the black sea okay and then maybe we start to see uh an agreement on a ceasefire for some period of days to then show both sides commitment to the fact that they want to engage in this political process in earnest.
- 2:41:39
You usually have to start somewhere and having a ceasefire lasting some period of days, a week, two weeks, a month, is that beginning. Right now, I don't see Russia there willing to agree to something like this. Because if they were, there's nothing that's been stopping them. That proposal's been on the table for a long time now. Their position is they don't want to agree to a ceasefire, They wish to settle all these complex, difficult issues, and only then will they offer a ceasefire. But the thrust of that position is they don't see a ceasefire and negotiations right now as a better alternative to fighting at the end of the day. And that's because Putin's perception of the situation, from my point of view, is different from ours, and also, I think, differs to some extent from objective reality, or at least I suspect that that's one of the inputs into his calculus.
- 2:42:31
If we look at longer-term future, what does Ukraine look like after Zelensky? What does Russia look like after Putin?